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individuals from whom they seek political contributions and, at election time, votes. This voter data is 
used for a variety of purposes, including voter contact and turnout, fundraising, honing of political 
messaging, and microtargeted communications designed specifically to appeal to small subsets of 
voters. Yet both privacy laws and election laws in Canada have failed to keep up with these developments 
in political campaigning and are in need of reform to protect voter privacy. We provide an overview of big 
data campaign practices, analyze the gaps in Canadian federal privacy and election law that enable such 
practices, and offer recommendations to amend federal laws to address the threats to voter privacy 
posed by big data campaigns. 
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Voter Privacy and Big-Data Elections
ELIZABETH F. JUDGE AND MICHAEL PAL*
Big data and analytics have changed politics, with serious implications for the protection of 
personal privacy and for democracy. Political parties now hold large amounts of personal 
information about the individuals from whom they seek political contributions and, at 
election time, votes. This voter data is used for a variety of purposes, including voter contact 
and turnout, fundraising, honing of political messaging, and microtargeted communications 
designed specifically to appeal to small subsets of voters. Yet both privacy laws and election 
laws in Canada have failed to keep up with these developments in political campaigning and 
are in need of reform to protect voter privacy. We provide an overview of big data campaign 
practices, analyze the gaps in Canadian federal privacy and election law that enable such 
practices, and offer recommendations to amend federal laws to address the threats to voter 
privacy posed by big data campaigns.
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THIS ARTICLE ADDRESSES THE CHALLENGES
Canadian political parties’ use of big data analytics.1 Big data, consisting of mass 
data collection and algorithmic analysis, is an integral part of Canadian politics, 
as parties collect, store, and analyze voter data in an effort to run more effective 
campaigns. As Ira Rubinstein defines the term, big data “refers to novel ways 
in which organizations, including government and businesses, combine diverse 
digital datasets and then use statistics and other data mining techniques to extract 
from them both hidden information and surprising correlations.”2 With big data 
techniques, large datasets are analysed for patterns, data is matched to categorise 
people into discrete segments by shared characteristics, and people are profiled 
1. Throughout the article, we use “voter” as a shorthand to refer to the individuals whose 
personal information is collected and used by political parties. We do recognise that some 
of these individuals may not have voted or registered to vote, but they are subjects of data 
collection by the parties and are at least potential voters. This category is broader than eligible 
voters, whom Elections Canada refers to as “electors.”
2. The term “big data” has been attributed to a 2011 McKinsey report. James Manyika et al, 
“Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity” (1 May 2011), 
online: McKinsey Global Institute <www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/
our-insights/big-data-the-next-frontier-for-innovation>. See generally, Ira S Rubinstein, “Big 
Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning” (2013) 3 Intl Data Privacy L 74 at 76.
 for voter privacy posed by 
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according to inferences based on data correlations. Applied to the election context, 
big data refers to the collection of large quantities of personal information about 
voters, the development of political party databases, and the use of a diverse set of 
technologies common in the private sector to analyze this information, including 
sophisticated algorithms, machine learning, and predictive analytics. Canada is 
no anomaly in this respect, as the use of big data in electoral campaigns is now 
widespread globally. In short, “[e]lections are becoming increasingly ‘datified.’”3
The rise of big data has immense implications for individual privacy, given 
the vast amounts of personal data collected and the lack of transparency about 
its use.4 The uses and potential abuses of big data in politics received global 
attention, with reverberations in Canada, in light of allegations that Facebook 
data about voters was misused in the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum and 
in the United States’ 2016 presidential election. In these incidents, data about 
Facebook users travelled downstream to a campaign consultant specializing in 
psychographic profiling, without users’ knowledge, and ended up in the hands 
of Cambridge Analytica, which specialises in big data analytics. The high-profile 
media coverage of Cambridge Analytica heightened public awareness of the 
3. UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Democracy Disrupted? Personal Information and 
Political Influence (ICO, 2018) at 10 [ICO, Democracy Disrupted]; Jamie Bartlett, Josh 
Smith & Rose Acton, The Future of Political Campaigning (Demos, 2018) at 26. See also 
Robert Yablon, “Campaigns, Inc.” (2018) 103 Minn L Rev 151; Jeff Chester & Kathryn C 
Montgomer, “The Role of Digital Marketing in Political Campaigns” (2017) 6 Internet Pol’y 
Rev 1; Zeynep Tufekci, “Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational 
Politics” (2014) 19 First Monday, online: < firstmonday.org/article/view/4901/4097>.
4. On big data and privacy see generally, Anita L Allen, “Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big 
Data Economy” (2016) 130 Harv L Rev 71; Julia Lane et al, eds, Privacy, Big Data, and the 
Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Omer Tene & 
Jules Polonetsky, “Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics” (2013) 
11 Nw Tech & Intell Prop 239; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, “Big Data and Due Process: 
Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms” (2014) 55 Boston College L Rev 
93; Solon Barocas, “Big Data’s End Run Around Procedural Privacy Protections” (2014) 57 
Comm ACM 31; Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (Broadway Books, 2017).
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privacy and political implications of vast troves of personal information being 
accessed and interpreted for elections.5
Canadian election and privacy law, however, has failed to keep pace with 
this move to digital campaigning, with significant implications for voter privacy. 
Unlike private companies’ collection and use of consumer data, which is subject 
to regulation under existing privacy legislation, political parties’ collection and 
use of voter data is largely exempt from federal privacy legislation. Political 
parties are specifically excluded from the federal privacy legislation regulating the 
public sector, the Privacy Act,6 and are not included in the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), the federal privacy legislation 
regulating the private sector.7 While election law has mechanisms to provide basic 
5. See generally Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Trust but Verify: Rebuilding 
Trust in the Digital Economy Through Effective, Independent Oversight, 2018, (Annual Report 
to Parliament on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the 
Privacy Act) Catalogue No IP51-1E-PDF (2018) online (pdf ): <www.priv.gc.ca/media/4831/
ar_201718_eng.pdf> [OPC, Trust but Verify] (on the electoral data targeting by Cambridge 
Analytica based on Facebook data); House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access 
to Information, Privacy and Ethics, Towards Privacy by Design: Review of the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, (February 2018) (Chair: Bob Zimmer), 
online (pdf ): <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/RP9690701/
ethirp12/ethirp12-e.pdf>  [ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design]; House of Commons, Standing 
Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, Democracy Under Threat: Risks 
and Solutions in the Era of Disinformation and Data Monopoly (December 2018) (Chair: Bob 
Zimmer), online (pdf ): <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/
RP10242267/ethirp17/ethirp17-e.pdf> [ETHI, Democracy Under Threat]; UK, Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Interim Report (Cm 
363, 2017-19) at 26-28 [Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation 
and ‘Fake News’ Interim Report]; UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Investigation into 
the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns (Report to Parliament) (6 November 2018), 
online (pdf ): < ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-use-
of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf> at 26-39 [ICO, Investigation 
into the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns]; Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada & Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, 
Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services Ltd. by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
and the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Canada, (PIPEDA Report of Findings) 
Catalogue No 2019-004 (November 2019), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-
decisions/investiations/investigations-into-businesses/2019/pipeda-2019-004> [OPC and 
OIPC BC, Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services]; Office of the Information and 
Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, Full Disclosure: Political Parties, Campaign Data, 
and Voter Consent, Investigation Report by Michael McEvoy, 2019 BCIPC 07 [McEvoy, 
Full Disclosure].
6. Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21.
7. SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA].
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information about individual voters to political parties through the National 
Register of Elections, it fails in any meaningful way to regulate mass voter data 
collection by parties. This gap in legal protection is striking because parties’ 
growing reliance on voter data and the increasingly sophisticated techniques for 
analyzing it have dramatically heightened the potential privacy risks for voters.
This article focuses on the practices of federal political parties8 with respect 
to collecting, storing, and using voters’ personal information and argues that 
political parties, like commercial entities and government, should be subject 
to privacy regulations.9 The use of personal data for political purposes is as 
susceptible to misuse as the use of personal data for commercial activities, 
but with consequences that reverberate beyond the marketplace and into the 
legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Protecting voter privacy is necessary to 
safeguard the privacy of voters and to safeguard the integrity of the electoral 
process. As the Information Commissioner’s Office in the United Kingdom 
warned, “we are at risk of developing a system of voter surveillance by default,” 
which “could have a damaging long-term effect on the fabric of our democracy 
and political life.”10 Political parties are an essential conduit for the “meaningful 
participation” of Canadians in elections and for democracy more generally in 
Canada.11 Without adequate protections for voter privacy, however, the evolving 
8. Political parties are heavily regulated entities under the Canada Elections Act. See SC 2000, 
c 9 [CEA]. They are defined in section 2 as: “an organization one of whose fundamental 
purposes is to participate in public affairs by endorsing one or more of its members as 
candidates and supporting their election.” While parties remain private rather than public 
organizations, their inner workings and legal obligations are defined in detail by the CEA, 
as are those of their “candidates” and “electoral district associations.” “Candidates” are 
individuals nominated by the political party to represent them in an electoral district and 
an “electoral district association” “means an association of members of a political party in an 
electoral district” (ibid, s 2, 71(1)). Other relevant regulated entities under the CEA include 
third parties, which are defined by section 349 to be “a person or a group, other than a 
candidate, registered party or electoral district association of a registered party.” Third parties 
are often labour unions, corporations, and civil society groups, but can also be individuals. 
See generally, Michael Pal, “Is the Permanent Campaign the End of the Egalitarian Model 
of Elections?” in Richard Albert, Paul Daly & Vanessa MacDonnell, eds, The Canadian 
Constitution in Transition (University of Toronto Press, 2019) 338 at 347-49 (for a recent 
discussion of the changing role of third parties).
9. We focus in this article on the law related to political parties. We emphasize from the outset, 
however, that a comprehensive solution for voter privacy requires addressing other actors and 
Canadian privacy law more generally.
10. ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 9. See also ICO, Investigation Into the Use of Data 
Analytics in Political Campaigns, supra note 5 at 19.
11. Figueroa v Canada (AG), 2003 SCC 37 at para 27 [Figueroa].
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big data practices of parties threaten to undermine the relationship between them 
and the voters they seek to influence and, most importantly, to represent.12
In the wake of recent incidents highlighting mass data use by political parties 
and the corresponding data vulnerabilities for voters, several changes have been 
put forward in Canada, including amendments to federal election law in the 
Elections Modernization Act (EMA)13 and a Parliamentary committee report 
proposing to make political parties subject to PIPEDA.14 While these are positive 
steps, the proposals do not go far enough. PIPEDA is a poor model to adopt for 
political parties because it does not impose sufficient privacy obligations on the 
private sector that it already regulates. Indeed, with the “protection” of PIPEDA, 
Canadians are extensively tracked online and are vulnerable to data breaches and 
prolific data collection and analysis.15 The EMA has the objective of addressing 
electoral digital threats but does not impose strong substantive limits on what 
parties can do with personal information held about voters. Legal reform, therefore, 
is still required. Reform should be done in a manner that respects the personal 
information of voters and the foundational democratic connection between them 
and political parties. To protect Canadians’ personal information in the special 
context of elections, we recommend that new legal duties be imposed on political 
parties that limit their use of voters’ personal information, while still ensuring 
that parties have enough information about voters to formulate public policy and 
12. Much has been written on the broader implications for democracy of digital campaigning. 
See generally, Philip Howard, New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Daniel Kreiss, Prototype Politics: Technology-Intensive Campaigning 
and the Data of Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2016); Cass R Sunstein, #Republic: 
Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton University Press, 2017); Colin 
J Bennett, “Trends in Voter Surveillance in Western Societies: Privacy Intrusions and 
Democratic Implications” (2015) 13 Surveillance & Soc’y 370; Damian Tambini, “Social 
Media Power and Election Legitimacy” in Damian Tambini & Martin Moore, eds, Digital 
Dominance: The Power of Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (Oxford University Press, 
2018) 265 at 289 (noting that “while social media still in theory offer new opportunities for 
democracy, the increasingly commercial and increasingly smart, data-driven social media may 
in the long term be on a collision course with the open, voluntary, equal public deliberation 
required by democracy”) [Tambini, “Social Media Power and Election Legitimacy”]. For the 
Canadian context, see Kaija Belfry Munroe & HD Munroe, “Constituency Campaigning in 
the Age of Data” (2018) 51 Can J Pol Sci 135.
13. SC 2018, c 31 [EMA].
14. ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5.
15. There is a vast literature on digital privacy. See e.g. H Jeff Smith, Tamara Dinev & Heng Xu, 
“Information Privacy Research: An Interdisciplinary Review” (2011) 35 MIS Q 989; Daniel 
Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (NYU Press, 2004); 
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational 
Principles, by Ann Cavoukian (Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 2009).
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to communicate with voters who consent to their personal information being 
used by political parties. Ensuring that political parties are subject to meaningful 
privacy rules is of paramount importance given the widespread and rising use of 
intrusive big data techniques in Canadian politics.
This article illustrates how Canadian federal legislation facilitates big data 
practices in politics, has failed to keep up with evolutions in political practice, 
and is in need of reform. Following this introduction, Part I explains the current 
framework under elections law for political parties to obtain data about voters, 
and details how Canadian political parties augment this information by recourse 
to big data. Part II explains the gaps in existing federal privacy and elections 
legislation (PIPEDA,16 the Privacy Act,17 and the Canada Elections Act (CEA),18 
including the 2018 amendments of the EMA19) and other relevant legislation, and 
examines the negative consequences for voter privacy of the legislative gaps. Part 
III advances a legal framework for enhancing voter privacy while still facilitating 
necessary communication between political parties and voters.
I. THE DATA PRACTICES OF CANADIAN PARTIES
Digital campaigns comprise a series of steps from identifying, learning about, 
and categorizing voters, to honing messages and communicating with them.20 
In federal politics in Canada, the process of voter data procurement begins with 
the CEA, which regulates political parties and other political entities. Under 
the CEA, parties are entitled to receive basic information about voters, which 
becomes the building block for data-led campaigning. Pursuant to section 44(1), 
the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) maintains a National Register of Electors (the 
“Register”). The Register contains personal information about electors, consisting 
of the surname, given name, gender, date of birth, and civic and mailing addresses 
of each elector.21 The definition for “personal information” in section 2(1) of the 
16. PIPEDA, supra note 7.
17. Privacy Act, supra note 6.
18. CEA, supra note 8.
19. EMA, supra note 13.
20. See Tambini, “Social Media Power and Election Legitimacy,” supra note 12, at 274 
(on the generic stages of a social media political campaign). He identifies the stages as 
building the audience, audience segmentation, message creation and testing, message 
targeting, and delivery.
21. Elections Canada, “Description of the National Register of Electors” (2019), 
online: Elections Canada <www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=reg/
des&document=index&lang=e>.
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CEA is the same as the one used in section 3 of the Privacy Act.22 The accuracy 
of the information is enhanced via sharing agreements between federal and 
provincial bodies.23 The Register serves to produce a list of electors to Elections 
Canada in order to administer the election,24 and to Members of Parliament 
(MPs) and registered parties and their candidates in order to campaign.25 Not 
all of the information is shared with political parties; for example, sex and date 
of birth are omitted.26 Electors can choose to opt out of the Register27 and to 
request access to the information that Elections Canada holds on them. The 
Privacy Commissioner may, at any time, audit how the personal information on 
the Register is protected.28
Candidates and MPs may use the list of electors to communicate with 
voters, including for the purposes of soliciting contributions and recruiting party 
members.29 The 2014 amendments to the CEA in the Fair Elections Act (FEA)30 
increased the available voter data by granting political parties easier access to 
information about who has cast a ballot. These so-called “bingo cards” record 
the identification number for each person who votes and are shared daily during 
advance voting and more frequently on election day.31
22. CEA, supra note 8, s 2(1); Privacy Act, supra note 6, s 3.
23. CEA, supra note 8, s 55(2).
24. Ibid, ss 93, 104.1, 105, 107, 109. “Electors” is the term used by Elections Canada for 
eligible voters.
25. Ibid, s 45.
26. Elections Canada, “Guidelines on Use of the Lists of Electors” (September 
2020), online: <www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&dir=ann/
loe_guide&document=index&lang=e>.
27. Elections Canada, “Description of the National Register of Electors,” supra note 21.
28. Privacy Act, supra note 6; see generally, Elections Canada, supra note 21.
29. CEA, supra note 8, ss 110, 111.
30. SC 2014, c 12 [FEA].
31. Ibid, s 52. This rule is now in section 291 of the CEA. See CEA, supra note 8, s 291. See 
also Laura Payton, “Privacy Concerns Raised by Marc Mayrand Over Election Changes,” 
Canadian Broadcasting Company (6 March 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
privacy-concerns-raised-by-marc-mayrand-over-election-changes-1.2563048>; Election Act, 
RSBC, 1985, c A-1 [BC EA]. Similarly, in British Columbia, the provincial Election Act was 
amended to inform political parties who voted in the last provincial election. The Office of 
the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia called the amendment 
regrettable, partially due to the fact that the office lacked jurisdiction to enforce privacy 
protections against political parties. See Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner 
for British Columbia, News Release, “Statement from B.C. Information and Privacy 
Commissioner regarding proposed amendments to Bill 20 (Election Amendment Act)” (14 
May 2015), online (pdf ): <www.oipc.bc.ca/news-releases/1792>. The British Columbia 
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To create more comprehensive voter profiles, political parties supplement 
basic voter data under the statutory entitlement with additional information 
from a variety of sources. Traditional means of acquiring voter data include 
telephone calls, door-to-door canvassing, surveys, polls, and records of political 
contributions.32 Newer technologies for the collection of voter information, 
including mobile applications, social media, commercial data, and location 
tracking on mobile devices such as smartphones, have augmented these traditional 
mechanisms. The collated voter information is stored in voter management 
systems, commonly referred to as voter or political party databases.
While membership lists have long been kept by political parties, voter 
databases are a relatively new phenomenon.33 The first Canadian political party 
to use a sophisticated database was the Conservative Party of Canada, whose 
Constituent Information Management System (CIMS) was built in 2004.34 
The Liberal Party of Canada built their own voter database management system 
called the “Liberalist.”35 The New Democratic Party currently uses a system called 
“Populus,”36 replacing their old “NDP Vote” system.37 The Green Party uses 
“Nation Builder,” a commercially available application for voter management 
and community mobilization.38 Apps for mobile devices enable canvassers to 
transfer information collected in the field to the central database.39 Data for 
national and local campaigns are now generally linked. Data may also flow 
Election Act does have some protections for voter privacy that are not present in the federal or 
other provincial statutes. See BC EA, supra note 31, s 275.
32. See Colin J Bennett & Robin M Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal 
Privacy Protection: A Comparative Analysis (Linden Consulting, 2012) online (pdf ): Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <www.priv.gc.ca/media/1756/pp_201203_e.pdf> at 16 
[Bennet & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy].
33. See Colin J Bennett, “The Politics of Privacy and the Privacy of Politics: Parties, Elections and 
Voter Surveillance in Western Democracies” (2013) 18 First Monday, online: <firstmonday.
org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4789/3730>.
34. Conservative Party of Canada database, “Constituent Information Management System,” 
online: <www.apps.conservative.ca/login?rdr=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.conservative.ca>.
35. Liberal Party of Canada database, “Liberalist,” online: <www.liberalist.liberal.ca>.
36. New Democratic Party of Canada database, “Populus,” online: <populus.ndp.ca/
foreAction1/login/auth>.
37. See Susan Delacourt, Shopping for Votes: How Politicians Choose Us and We Choose Them, 
2nd ed (Douglas and McIntyre, 2013) at 307; Colin Bennett, “They’re Spying on You: How 
Party Databases Put Your Privacy at Risk” (1 September 2015), online: iPolitics, <ipolitics.
ca/2015/09/01/theyre-spying-on-you-how- party-databases-put-your-privacy-at-risk>.
38. Nationbuilder, “Home,” online: <www.nationbuilder.com>; McEvoy, Full Disclosure, 
supra note 5 at 27.
39. See e.g. Liberalist, “What is Liberalist,” online: <www.liberalist.liberal.ca/what-is>.
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between affiliated federal and provincial parties or between the national and 
provincial wings of a federal party. In some instances, provincial and federal 
databases are amalgamated, and in other instances provincial parties prefer to act 
independently of their federal counterparts’ data strategies.40 Provincial parties 
sometimes voluntarily subscribe to federal party databases.41
With the traditional techniques to collect information about voters, such 
as canvassing households, voters generally had the autonomy to choose whether 
to share information with parties and could vary the level of detail and the type 
of information shared. Over the course of the last several elections in Canada, 
however, voter data collection and analysis techniques have evolved rapidly 
such that data collection is less transparent and more intrusive.42 In the absence 
of strong regulatory oversight from any level of government, it was difficult 
to know precisely the type and amount of personal information that each 
party collects, since parties typically viewed their data practices as providing 
a potential competitive advantage and were reticent about the sources and 
types of information collected.43 However, investigations that were conducted 
globally by privacy commissioners in search of answers, after such high-profile 
voter data incidents as Cambridge Analytica, have revealed many details about 
parties’ heretofore guarded practices surrounding data-driven campaigns.44 
Major technology-driven changes include parties’ development of their own 
mobile apps, reliance on advertising through social media, use of databrokers 
as information intermediaries, reliance on predictive analyses, the application 
of big data analysis to discern information about segments of populations as 
well as individual voters, and the deployment of campaign strategies that borrow 
40. Belfry Munroe & Munroe, supra note 12 at 16-18.
41. See Adrian Morrow, “Ontario Liberals to Target Ethnic Voters with Demographic Database 
Software” The Globe and Mail (14 April 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
politics/database-helps-liberals-woo-ethnic-vote/article17953049/>.
42. See Rebecca Green, “Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity” (2013) 85 Temp L Rev 367 
at 383; Philip N Howard & Daniel Kreiss, “Political Parties and Voter Privacy: Australia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and United States in Comparative Perspective,” (2010) 15 
First Monday, online: <www.firstmonday.org/article/view/2975/2627>.
43. Bennett & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy Protection, supra 
note 32 at 16; Howard & Kreiss, supra note 42 at 19.
44. OPC, Trust but Verify, supra note 5; ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5; ETHI, 
Democracy Under Threat, supra note 5; ICO, Investigation into the Use of Data Analytics in 
Political Campaigns, supra note 5; OPC and OIPC BC, Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ 
Data Services, supra note 5; McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5.
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techniques from commercial marketing.45 The investigations have illuminated 
how modern information technologies can enable even a small databroker’s 
activities to wreak “global and cascading privacy implications” that cross 
continents and involve the data of tens of millions people.46
With the rise of big data, political parties can harness voter data by greater 
orders of magnitude, and subsequently target voters with far greater precision.47 
Political parties increasingly rely on data that is not overtly “political,” including 
commercial information, to glean insights about voters’ political preferences.48 
Data about voters is an amalgamation of consumer data, basic electoral data, public 
records, internet browsing, search engine queries, social media postings, mailing 
lists, subscriptions and memberships, loyalty cards, credit card information, online 
purchases, and geolocation information from mobile devices, which is added to 
the voter information that parties have collected based on their interactions with 
voters and the data provided from the Voter Contact Registry (the “Registry”).49 
With the increased use of wearable devices (such as fitness trackers), home 
assistants, home security cameras, smart televisions, gaming consoles, and other 
Internet of Things devices, data will become increasingly precise and profuse 
about specific individuals, including activities and movements. Traditional 
metrics about voters, such as neighbourhood, income, educational level, and 
ethnicity, are rudimentary in relation to the variety and amount of information 
that can be collected about individuals from online and networked sources and 
the detailed tools for profiling available with modern algorithmic technologies.
Parties seek to learn ever more detailed information about increasingly discrete 
segments of the population and then to microtarget those audiences through 
advertising or other communications, honed to appeal specifically to that small 
subset’s preferences, rather than the population as a whole. These techniques 
of big data are used prolifically and with more sophistication in each election 
45. See Claudio Feijóo, José-Luis Gómez-Barroso & Shivom Aggarwal, “Economics of Big 
Data” in Johannes M Bauer & Michael Latzer eds, Handbook on the Economics of the 
Internet (Edward Elgar, 2016); ICO, Investigation Into the Use of Data Analytics in Political 
Campaigns, supra note 5 at 18.
46. OPC & OIPC BC, Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services, supra note 5, 
“Conclusion”; see also McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5.
47. ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 21.
48. For example, the US Republican Party began using consumer information to target voters in 
the 1980s. See Green, supra note 42 at 384.
49. See Elizabeth F Judge & Michael Pal, Privacy and the Electorate: Big Data and the 
Personalization of Politics (SSHRC Knowledge Synthesis Grant Report) (October 2016).
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cycle.50 Big data produces a large economic ecosystem in which multiple players 
are involved in the curation, analysis, and use of data.51 Political parties work in 
advance with analytic companies to develop their respective voter models.52
Social media companies like Google, Twitter, and Facebook have played 
an increasingly influential role in the new era of data-driven campaigns, 
facilitating targeted advertising and making social media an indispensable part of 
modern-day campaigns.53 Social media platforms not only generate information 
about individuals based on their online activities, but are also used by parties 
and candidates to communicate with individuals.54 Social media supports 
microtargeting by enabling parties to choose the audience for a message, and 
which version of that message is sent. For example, with Facebook, political 
parties can choose “core audiences” (whereby an audience is manually selected for 
particular traits such as location, gender, age, or interests); “custom audiences” 
(whereby parties upload individuals’ contact details and Facebook matches that 
with their data); and “lookalike audiences” (whereby Facebook sends the message 
to a dynamically changing set of Facebook users who have similar interests to the 
50. Belfry Munroe & Munroe, supra note 12. The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office 
notes that the “extent to which political parties use social media, data analytics, and 
micro-targeting techniques is—to a large extent—dependent on their size, resources, and 
reach into the electorate.” See ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 21.
51. Feijóo, Gómez-Barroso & Aggarwal, supra note 45 at 513-14.
52. ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 27.
53. As of February 2018, “Facebook and Google have 60% of US digital ad spend and 20% 
of total global spend.” See Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation 
and ‘Fake News’ Interim Report, supra note 5 at para 87. See also Daniel Kreiss & Shannon 
C McGregor, “Technology Firms Shape Political Communication: The Work of Microsoft, 
Facebook, Twitter, and Google with Campaigns During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Cycle” 
(2018) 35 Pol Comm 155 (on the major internet platforms’ role as active agents in the 
political process of shaping political communications). Tambini cautions against the 
consolidation and vertical integration of campaign services in one platform, noting Facebook 
is a “one-stop-shop for fundraising, recruitment, profiling, segmentation, message targeting, 
and delivery” and is also a foreign company for most of the globe. As Tambini flags, platform 
dominance could lead to unintentional or deliberate biases. See Tambini, “Social Media 
Power and Election Legitimacy,” supra note 12 at 281-82.
54. See Sofia Grafanaki, “Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data” (2017) 27 Fordham 
IP Media & Ent LJ 801 at 859-60; Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (Broadway 
Books, 2017) at 180-84.
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fixed custom audience).55 Social media platforms also create a larger ecosystem of 
data about people. Through access to contact lists on mobile devices and social 
media, personal information is collected not only about the user but also about 
a user’s friends and family, a practice that has become increasingly controversial 
because of the lack of transparency to the user and a lack of consent by the 
contacts.56 For instance, in some campaign apps, users are asked to login using 
their email, phone number, or Facebook account, where the latter grants the 
candidate’s campaign access to personal information available on Facebook as 
well as a list of their friends and family (who do not have the opportunity to 
consent).57 Further, social media companies exchange data about their users 
prolifically with other internet companies.58
55. See Facebook, “Ad Audiences,” online: <www.facebook.com/business/
help/168922287067163>. Facebook has offered “value-based lookalike audiences” since 
2017. Likewise, Google Ads supports audience targeting by demographics, custom audiences, 
and “similar audiences.” See Google Ads Help, “Targeting Your Ads,” online: <www.support.
google.com/google-ads/answer/1704368?hl=en>. See also ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra 
note 3 at 41-42 (noting that for all the online platforms the “full range of advertising services 
are available to political parties and campaigns in the same way as they are to all other 
organizations”); McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5, at 25; OPC and OIPC BC, Joint 
Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services, supra note 5.
56. As an example of non-users’ data entering the data market, the Canadian company 
uCampaign’s mobile app asks app users for permission to access their address books and 
employs “gamification” strategies to motivate people to engage with political campaigns by 
awarding users points for sending texts and emails to contacts. See Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Interim Report, supra note 5 at paras 
121-22. See also Aleksandra Korolova, “Privacy Violations Using Microtargeted Ads: A Case 
Study” (2011) 3 J Privacy & Confidentiality 27-49; David Ingram, “Facebook Fuels Broad 
Privacy Debate by Tracking Non-Users” Reuters (15 April 2018), online: <www.reuters.
com/article/us-facebook-privacy-tracking/facebook-fuels-broad-privacy-debate-by-tracking-
non-users-idUSKBN1HM0DR>; Rob Price, “Facebook Collects Data on Non-Users 
for ‘Security’ – Here’s the Whole Story” Business Insider (11 April 2018), online: <www.
businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-collects-data-non-users-for-security-2018-4>.
57. Between 2010 and 2014, Facebook had “Friends Permissions,” which “allowed developers 
to access data related to users’ friends, without the knowledge or consent of those friends.” 
After 2014, some of these practices continued. GSR, the company owned by the Cambridge 
professor whose research was used by Cambridge Analytica, relied on a “pre-existing 
application functioning under Facebook’s old terms of service” after Facebook revised their 
terms of service to prevent that kind of data scraping. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Interim Report, supra note 5 at paras 102, 105; 
ICO, Investigation into the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns, supra note 5 at 30-31.
58. See e.g. Gabriel JX Dance, Michael LaForgia & Nicholas Confessore, “As Facebook Raised a 
Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech Giants” New York Times (18 December 2018), 
online: <www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html>.
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Typically in campaigns’ voter databases, voters are assigned scores that 
measure their political leaning, which is extrapolated from the amalgamated 
data.59 This “persuadability score” influences whether an individual is contacted 
by a candidate, by what communication method, and how much effort is put into 
convincing them to vote or delivering them to the polls. As these scoring schemes 
have matured, they encompass ever-more personal information from more 
sources. The score is used to allow campaigns to effectively target voters, thereby 
producing more efficient campaign tools, such as walk lists, phone lists, email 
lists, and lawn sign allocations.60 Persuadability scores can be especially effective 
for mobilizing marginal voters who are instrumental in close elections, enabling 
parties to target swing voters or the geographical areas where ridings are in play.
Left unchecked, the future of data-driven campaigns will become even 
more individualised and data-dependent, and accordingly pose more serious 
challenges for voter privacy. A 2018 study for the UK Information Commissioner 
identified seven trends for data analytics in political campaigns: detailed audience 
segmentation to create more granular categories and more atomization of voters; 
cross-device targeting through geolocation data and the Internet of Things to 
identify data across multiple devices as belonging to a single person and to 
customise messages for a “segment of one”; growth in psychographic techniques 
and facial recognition to target messages by emotional state; use of artificial 
intelligence to measure and improve campaign messages in real time; use of 
artificial intelligence to automatically generate bespoke advertising based on an 
individual’s interactions with chatbots; use of mass personal data to improve the 
prediction of election results; and new delivery platforms for campaign messages 
such as wearables, smart TV, and virtual reality.61 Not all of these practices are 
evident yet in Canada. Any new technology that gathers relevant information 
about voters, however, will eventually be useful to political parties. The import of 
these trends is a coalescence toward customising unique messages for an audience 
of one voter. Accordingly, campaigns “will be incentivised to hold or obtain more 
personal data on individuals, and to collect as much diverse data as possible, 
in order to maximise the effectiveness of their messaging.”62
59. Belfry Munroe & Munroe, supra note 12 at 12. For example, in CIMS each voter in the 
database is assigned a score of -15 to +15, while the Liberalist scoring ranks voters on a 
scale of 1 to 10.
60. Delacourt, supra note 37 at 246-47, 254-55.
61. Bartlett, Smith & Acton, supra note 3 at 27-37.
62. Bartlett, Smith & Acton, supra note 3 at 38.
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The particular ways in which political campaigners use data analytics have 
important implications for the quality and extent of engagement between parties 
and Canadians, with a resulting impact on voter privacy and democracy.63 First, 
microtargeting enables politicians to home in on the segment of the population 
that is likely to vote for them and, by extension, enables parties to identify 
voters who are very unlikely to vote for them. Rather than designing messages 
for the entire population or a region, the rational calculus for parties with scarce 
resources is to mobilise the voters most likely to support them and not to waste 
precious time and money attempting to contact or persuade individuals who 
are likely to be unreceptive. For instance, the Liberal Party database has “the 
capacity to sort neighbourhoods for canvassing, to identify which houses were 
worth visiting and which houses were not.”64 A candidate seeking to cover as 
much ground as possible during canvassing could use metrics to determine that 
it was only worth knocking on the doors of some houses on a street. The Council 
of Europe has warned of such “political redlining,” meaning the deliberate lack 
of engagement by a party with voters who have been identified by the data 
as unlikely to vote or as being part of a constituency that is not necessary to 
win an election.65 The Council has cautioned that the redlining effects can be 
compounded in subsequent elections as data from past elections influences future 
campaign choices.
More sinisterly than the risk that some voters will be ignored by some 
parties, microtargeting also raises the spectre of direct voter suppression. If big 
data analytics designed to predict the intentions of voters can be used to mobilise 
turnout, it can also be used to suppress it. Voter suppression tactics include 
any communication designed to dissuade an individual from casting a ballot, 
including circulating disinformation regarding voting procedures. The kind of 
misleading automated phone calls designed to suppress turnout in the “robocalls” 
63. Solon Barocas identified four ways that microtargeting contributes to undermining 
democracy: (1) an increased willingness and ability to deliver messages on wedge issues that 
would be extremely divisive in a more public forum; (2) voter discrimination and de facto 
disenfranchisement; (3) a chilling of political participation due to perceived violations of 
voters’ privacy; and (4) a general trend toward single issue politics that leads to increased 
partisanship among voters and ambiguous political mandates for elected representatives. 
Solon Barocas, “The Price of Precision: Voter Microtargeting and Its Potential Harms to the 
Democratic Process” (PLEAD ‘12: Proceedings of the First Edition Workshop on Politics, 
Election, and Data, ACM New York, November 2012), (2012) ACM 31.
64. Delacourt, supra note 37 at 287.
65. Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on Media Pluralism and Transparency of Media 
Ownership, Feasibility Study on the Use of Internet in Elections, MSI-MED 3rd Meeting 
(2017) at 13 [COE, Feasibility Study on the Use of Internet in Elections].
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL16
scandal during the 2011 Canadian federal election could be replicated through 
online communications with the same intent.66 The “robocalls” gave misleading 
information about where individuals could vote and some involved fraudulent 
impersonation of Elections Canada officials. Attempts by foreign actors at voter 
suppression in the 2016 United States presidential election involved interference 
through social media platforms and relied on data analytics to carry them out.67
Second, the manner in which parties use big data analytics encourages the 
treatment of voters as consumers. The precision of modern microtargeting by 
political parties depends on combining information traditionally considered 
to have political relevance with insights drawn from other information, such 
as consumer purchases. Modern campaign practices of Canadian political 
parties conflate the individual as consumer and the individual as citizen, thereby 
producing campaign strategies that closely emulate marketing strategies designed 
for consumers.68
Third, microtargeting may provide incentives for negative messaging and 
wedge issues, which could result in more divisive campaigns.69 The United 
Kingdom’s report on disinformation characterised it as “relentless targeting of 
hyper-partisan views, which play to the fears and the prejudices of people, in order 
to alter their voting plans.”70 As a research consultancy cautioned, “there is a 
danger that political messaging will become more emotional in tone, appealing 
more often to anger, frustration or prejudice, in an attempt to mobilise voters 
and maximise engagement with content,” which is “likely to have other, longer 
term effects on the health of democracy.”71 Microtargeting could exacerbate 
the effects of echo chambers (content from like-minded individuals) and filter 
66. See Michael Pal, “Canadian Election Administration on Trial: ‘Robocalls,’ Opitz, and 
Disputed Elections in the Courts” (2017) 28 King’s LJ 324.
67. See US, Robert S Mueller, Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference in the 2016 
Presidential Election, vol 1 (Department of Justice, March 2019). See especially ibid at 24-26.
68. Delacourt, supra note 37.
69. COE, Feasibility Study on the Use of Internet in Elections, supra note 65 at 12-13.
70. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Interim 
Report, supra note 5 at para 92.
71. Bartlett, Smith & Acton, supra note 3 at 40.
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bubbles (algorithmically-selected content based on presumptions of the user’s 
interests), which magnify confirmation biases.72
Fourth, big data campaign practices based on incorrect information about 
voters or faulty techniques of analysis can limit interactions between candidates 
and voters. If a party relies on data analysis based on faulty inferences that 
draw incorrect conclusions about a voter’s persuadability, the party could fail 
to contact a voter who actually could have been swayed. If a candidate sends 
direct mail advertising with strong messaging to an eligible voter who is slightly 
undecided but is leaning towards the opposing candidate, then the advertising 
could inadvertently provoke the voter to vote for the opposing candidate.73 Not 
only are individuals with an incorrect persuadability score less likely to hear the 
platforms that they would have been receptive to, they may also be systematically 
excluded from the process of shaping the party’s platforms.
Fifth, parties’ use of detailed voter profiles has privacy implications for 
individuals regardless of whether the data profiles lead to accurate inferences. 
Whether or not big data collection and analysis is accurate enough to help the 
campaigns, there are significant privacy implications of campaigns collecting, 
storing, and analyzing vast amounts of personal information about voters and 
making important decisions about voters’ “persuadability” based on that analysis. 
The logic of big data is that there is never enough: More data supposedly produces 
more accurate inferences. The incentives in data-driven campaigns will continue 
to push for parties to collect ever more personal information about voters 
continuously and ubiquitously in an effort to generate more accurate predictions 
than the other campaigns.
At this stage, it is unclear whether big data analytics is producing the desired 
effects for parties of better identifying likely voters and better honing messages 
to persuade those people to vote. There are some indications that the advantages 
72. See Cass R Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton University Press, 2001) (on echo chambers); 
Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web is Changing What We Read and 
How We Think (Penguin, 2012) (filter bubbles); Damian Tambini et al, “The New Political 
Campaigning” (2017), online (pdf ): London School of Economics and Political Science 
<eprints.lse.ac.uk/71945/7/LSE%20MPP%20Policy%20Brief%2019%20-%20The%20
new%20political%20campaigning_final.pdf> (on filter bubbles and campaigns); Natali 
Hehlberger, “Exposure Plurality as a Policy Goal” (2012) 4 J Media L 65.
73. See SC Gwynne, “Retail Politics” (January 2006), online: Texas Monthly <www.texasmonthly.
com/articles/retail-politics> at 1.
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to the parties of extensive data profiles may be exaggerated.74 One study found 
a single Facebook like by a voter for a politician in a multi-party system predicts 
voter intention as accurately as hundreds of heterogeneous likes.75 Weighing 
the potential benefits and harms of big data campaigning for the quality and 
extent of individuals’ interactions with political parties and for voter privacy is 
a complicated exercise. The personal information collected, stored, analyzed, 
and used by political parties fuels a host of strategies whose aggregate impact on 
democratic politics is not clear at this stage in the evolution of the technologies. 
If it is working as its proponents claim and the parties deploying these techniques 
hope, big data analytics facilitates political engagement and voter persuasion: 
It helps parties to be responsive to voters’ concerns and to communicate to voters 
in the manner most conducive to voters understanding parties’ policies and being 
persuaded to vote for them. Even the rosiest picture of the use of big data in 
federal politics, however, must acknowledge that it has transformed campaigning 
and the practices of political parties in significant ways that should be addressed, 
including safeguarding voter privacy. An optimistic view of the benefits of big 
data in politics does not justify the hands-off attitude of current electoral and 
privacy law toward political parties with regard to voter privacy. We turn in the 
next section to explaining why the existing legal framework is flawed and does 
not adequately protect voter privacy.
74. See e.g. Colin Bennett, “How Campaign ‘Micro-Targeting’ Works—And Why It 
Probably Doesn’t” (9 September 2015), online: iPolitics <ipolitics.ca/2015/09/09/
how-campaign-micro-targeting-works-and-why-it-probably-doesnt/> (on the inability to 
determine whether political campaigns are successful because of their reliance on big data or 
in spite of it).
75. Jakob Bæk Kristensen et al, “Parsimonious Data: How a Single Facebook Like Predicts 
Voting Behavior in Multiparty Systems” (2017) 12 PLoS ONE e0184562, online: <doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184562> (finding that “a few, but selective digital traces produce 
prediction accuracies that are on par or even greater than most current approaches based 
upon bigger and broader datasets”). See also Joshua L Kella & David E Broockman, “The 
Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 
49 Field Experiments” (2018) 112 Am Pol Sci Rev 148 at 148 (finding that, based on a 
meta-analysis of 49 field experiments, “the best estimate of the effects of campaign contact 
and advertising on Americans’ candidate choices in general elections is zero”).
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II. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR VOTER PRIVACY
A. THE PRIVACY ACT AND PIPEDA
Privacy concerns with voter data arise not only because of the centrality of 
personal information to the activities of political parties and the availability of 
ever-more sophisticated technologies with which to analyse it, but also because 
those activities are largely unregulated by privacy legislation or by elections law.76 
Although the CEA confers some protections to voters’ personal information,77 
it does not specifically regulate voter privacy nor significantly restrict the use of 
personal information by political parties if used for purposes related to elections.78 
Further, even though electors may opt out of the Register,79 political parties can 
continue to collect information about voters who have exercised their opt-out.
Political parties are not currently subject to federal privacy legislation 
regarding the collection, storage, and use of personal information. The two main 
pieces of privacy legislation federally are the Privacy Act and PIPEDA. Political 
parties are clearly not covered by the Privacy Act, which applies to the public 
sector. Canada’s Privacy Act was designed with the intent to “protect the privacy 
of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by 
a government institution” and to “provide individuals with a right of access to 
that information.”80 The Privacy Act applies only to “government institutions.”81 
“Government institution” is defined under section 3 of the Privacy Act as “any 
department or ministry of state of the Government of Canada, or any body 
or office, listed in the schedule, and…any parent Crown corporation, and any 
wholly-owned subsidiary of such a corporation….”82 Political parties are heavily 
76. See Fenwick McKelvey & Jill Piebiak, “Does the Difference Compute? Data-Driven 
Campaigning in Canada,” in Mireille Lalancette, Vincent Raynauld, & Erin Crandall, eds, 
What’s Trending in Canadian Politics? Understanding Transformations in Power, Media, and the 
Public Sphere (UBC Press, 2019) at 208; Bennett & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties 
and Personal Privacy Protection, supra note 32.
77. As noted above, s 2(1) of the CEA adopts the same definition for “personal information” 
as that used in s 3 of Canada’s Privacy Act. See CEA, supra note 8, s 2(1); Privacy Act, 
supra note 6, s 3.
78. CEA, supra note 8, s 111(f ). The provision states that “no person shall… (f ) knowingly use 
personal information that is recorded in a list for a purpose other than (i) to enable registered 
parties, eligible parties, members or candidates to communicate with electors in accordance 
with section 110, or (ii) a federal election or referendum.”
79. Elections Canada, “Description of the National Register of Electors,” supra note 21.
80. Privacy Act, supra note 6, s 2.
81. Ibid, s 3.
82. Ibid.
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regulated by electoral regulation but are independent, private entities. They are 
not departments or ministries or Crown corporations for purposes of section 3 
and are not mentioned in the Schedule. Political parties therefore operate outside 
of the Privacy Act.
PIPEDA is the federal privacy legislation pertaining to the private sector. 
Although political parties are not explicitly exempt from the statute, they are 
outside its jurisdiction when engaged in traditional political activities. PIPEDA 
applies to all provinces except the three provinces that have “substantially similar” 
private-sector data protection legislation.83 PIPEDA incorporates the set of ten 
fair information principles that are commonly used internationally in legislation 
and regulatory instruments as a framework to protect personal information.84 
Personal information is defined in PIPEDA as “information about an identifiable 
individual,”85 which is a broad enough phrase that it would otherwise capture 
information about voters gathered by parties. PIPEDA applies, however, only 
to an organization that “collects, uses, or discloses [personal information] in 
the course of commercial activities.”86 “Commercial activities” are defined as 
“any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct 
that is of a commercial character, including the selling, bartering or leasing of 
donor, membership or other fundraising lists.”87 Political parties must have a 
“political purpose” in order to be registered under the Canada Elections Act.88 
Parties generally do not engage in “commercial activities” within the meaning 
of PIPEDA when they are engaged in activities that have a “political” purpose.89 
Political parties, accordingly, would generally be unregulated by PIPEDA in how 
they collect, store, and use data about voters. This would be true even if the 
83. See Alberta, Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5; British Columbia, Personal 
Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 [BC PIPA]; Québec, An Act Respecting the 
Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, RSQ c P-39.1.
84. The ten fair information principles are: (1) Accountability; (2) Identifying Purposes; 
(3) Consent; (4) Limiting Collection; (5) Limiting, Use, Disclosure, and Retention; (6) 
Accuracy; (7) Safeguards; (8) Openness; (9) Individual Access; and (10) Challenging 
Compliance. See PIPEDA, supra note 7, Schedule I.
85. PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 2(1). Personal information also includes inferences about an 
identifiable individual. See e.g. ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 30.
86. PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 4(1) (emphasis added).
87. Ibid, s 2(1).
88. CEA, supra note 8, s 2(1).
89. Bennett & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy Protection, supra  
note 32.
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parties obtain voter data from a commercial organization such as a databroker 
that is itself subject to PIPEDA.90
B. OTHER LEGISLATION ON VOTER PRIVACY
There are other pieces of potentially relevant legislation that provide rights 
related to the control of personal information or that protect voter privacy in 
limited contexts. First, provincial privacy law applies in British Columbia to 
riding associations of both provincial and federal political parties in the province. 
In British Columbia, the Personal Information and Protection Act (PIPA) defines 
the “organizations” to which it applies more broadly than the definition of 
“organization” under PIPEDA.91 While it has been clear that the BC provincial 
privacy statute’s broader definition applied to provincial political parties, the 
BC Information and Privacy Commissioner has ruled that it also applies to 
the electoral district associations in the province of federal parties registered 
under the CEA.92
There are also federal statutes beyond PIPEDA and the CEA that may be 
relevant to voter information in some situations. The Access to Information Act93 
permits individuals to request information on specific topics from a “government 
institution,”94 and thus might seem to provide an avenue for individuals to access 
the information that parties hold about them. Political parties are not subject to 
the access to information regime, however, by virtue of their exclusion from the 
list of “government institutions” subject to the Access to Information Act.95
The Telecommunications Act and associated rules and regulations apply to 
some aspects of communications between political entities and voters, including 
90. It is possible that a political party could be engaging in a “commercial activity” for purposes 
of PIPEDA, if, for example, it were to sell membership lists for non-political purposes. See 
PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 2(1).
91. BC PIPA, supra note 83, s 3(1) (defining organization to include a person, an unincorporated 
association, a trade union, a trust, and a non-profit organization); ibid, s 3(2) (exceptions, 
which do not apply to political parties); PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 2(1) (defining organization 
to include an association, partnership, a person, and a trade union).
92. Re Courtenay-Alberni Riding Association of the New Democratic Party of Canada (28 August 
2019), 2019 BCIPC 34, Order P19-02 online (pdf ): <oipc.bc.ca/orders/2331> [Order 
P19-02]. The ruling held that because the pith and substance of PIPA was to regulate data 
protection and not to regulate elections, it was not unconstitutional for the provincial privacy 
statute to apply to federal parties. Ibid at paras 1, 95.
93. RSC 1985, c A-1.
94. Ibid, s 2(1).
95. Ibid, Schedule I.
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email, phone, and text contacts.96 Political parties and candidates are exempt 
from the National Do Not Call List that pertains to unsolicited telemarketing 
calls, but they must maintain an internal do-not-call list.97 The principled reason 
for their exemption is that parties need to be able to communicate directly with 
voters (including by telephone), and therefore, if individuals were allowed to 
block contact from parties, it would undermine a relationship that is necessary 
in a democracy. A less charitable reading would be that the Parliamentarians 
who voted on the law may have had their own interests in mind in exempting 
candidates, parties, and other political entities.
Political parties are also largely excluded from national anti-spam legislation, 
which limits unsolicited email communications, if parties are soliciting opinions 
or contributions.98 However, there are regulations to increase transparency around 
communications with voters during elections.99 The Canadian Radio-Television 
and Communications Commission (CRTC) and Elections Canada have signed a 
joint memorandum of understanding on how to jointly regulate “Voter Contact 
Calling Services” during elections.100 Both the CRTC and Elections Canada have 
legislative roles, under the Telecommunications Act and the CEA respectively, 
to regulate communications with electors. These rules and agency practices have 
restricted some forms of voter contact.101 The CRTC oversees a “Voter Contact 
Registry” to protect Canadians from misleading phone calls during elections 
and increase accountability.102 Political parties and candidates are also prohibited 
96. SC 1993, c 38, s 41.7. See CRTC, “Rules for Unsolicited Telecommunications Made 
on Behalf of Political Entities” (17 March 2019), online: CRTC <crtc.gc.ca/eng/phone/
telemarketing/politi.htm> (for a summary of the Telecommunications Act).
97. The Do Not Call List has exceptions permitting unsolicited telemarketing calls from political 
parties, candidates, and riding associations, as well as registered Canadian charities, pollsters, 
and newspapers. See CRTC, “Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules” (31 March 2013) at 
Part II, online: CRTC <crtc.gc.ca/eng/trules-reglest.htm>.
98. An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain 
activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities, 
and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the 
Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the 
Telecommunications Act, SC 2010, c 23 at s 13 [“Anti-Spam Legislation”].
99. For an overview of the applicable rules, see CRTC, “Rules for Unsolicited 
Telecommunications Made on Behalf of Political Entities,” supra note 97.
100. Memorandum from CRTC & Elections Canada, “Memorandum of Understanding” (1 
April 2015), online: Elections Canada <elections.ca/content.aspx?section=abo&dir=mou/
crtc&document=index&lang=e>.
101. Telecommunications Act, supra note 96, ss 41-41.7, 72.01-72.15; CEA, supra note 8, 
ss 348.02, 348.03, 348.04.
102. CEA, supra note 8, ss 348.02, 348.03, 348.04.
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from using pre-recorded “robocalls” to contact voters for solicitations unless there 
is explicit consent.103
 This balanced approach of allowing political parties to contact voters 
who have not opted out, but regulating the contact to reduce fraudulent and 
misleading communications, is sound for an electoral democracy where informed 
individual participation is important. Without the connection between voters 
and those that seek to represent them, electoral democracy cannot function 
properly. Democracy requires individual participation and that parties be able 
to interact with those whom their candidates seek to represent. Parties need to 
know the concerns of the electorate in order to represent them in a democracy. 
At the same time, voter privacy is an important consideration. With reference to 
the Voter Contact Registry, the CRTC explains that “the desire to connect with 
voters must be tempered with respect for Canadians’ privacy and the protection 
of their right to refuse to be contacted by individuals or political groups if they 
so choose.”104 These CRTC rules address voter privacy in the specific context 
of unsolicited telecommunications to voters on behalf of political entities. But 
they were not designed to have, and have not had, a meaningful impact on voter 
privacy in general and do not attempt to address big data analytics.
C. SELF-REGULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES
Before 2018, in the absence of any clear legislative requirements on voter privacy, 
political parties regulated themselves through their own privacy policies.105 All 
of the major federal parties, the Liberal Party of Canada, Conservative Party of 
Canada, New Democratic Party, Bloc Québécois, and Green Party of Canada, 
103. CRTC, “Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules,” supra note 97 at Part IV.
104. CRTC, “Protecting You from Rogue and Misleading Calls During Elections” (25 July 2019), 
online: CRTC <crtc.gc.ca/eng/phone/rce-vcr/guidecan.htm#infograph-can>.
105. See Dara Lithwick, “Privacy and Politics: Federal Political Parties’ Adherence to Recognized 
Fair Information Principles” (2016) 10 JPPL 39; Colin J Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections 
and Political Parties in Canada: Privacy Implications, Privacy Policies and Privacy 
Obligations” (2018) 16 CJLT 195 [Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections”].
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have privacy policies available on their websites.106 These policies, however, 
do not explicitly reference the use of the parties’ respective voter management 
systems and offer relatively little detail on the type of data that is stored in 
their databases and the manner in which it is used. It is difficult, because of 
the policies’ vague wording, for voters to know whether their provisions pertain 
solely to the political parties’ websites or apply to a fuller range of their activities, 
including the databases.107 The parties’ privacy policies accord individuals some 
rights consistent with fair information principles, modified to account for federal 
elections requirements such as recordkeeping pertaining to campaign financing. 
The parties’ level of compliance with their own internal policies has been unclear, 
however, because prior to the CEA amendments in 2018 the parties did not have 
privacy reporting obligations and post-2018 there are only minimal ones.108
The parties’ privacy policies include some statements about the downstream 
uses of personal information, such as whether voter data may be shared with, 
or sold to, data intermediaries, or whether voter information can be shared with 
local ridings. The policies have not been explicit about data procurement, such 
as whether personal information is obtained from third-party aggregators.109 
It has also been unclear whether voter data is surrendered to outside entities.110 
Nor has it been clear what data security measures (e.g., encryption and 
prohibiting data transfer to USB keys) political parties are currently using to 
protect voters’ personal information against hacking and other data leaks.111 The 
Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s outward facing national 
security agency, concluded in recent reports that a lack of security protections 
106. See Liberal Party of Canada, “Privacy Policy” (last visited 25 October 2020), online: Liberal 
Party of Canada <liberal.ca/privacy>; Conservative Party of Canada, “Privacy Policy” 
(last visited 25 October 2020), online: Conservative Party of Canada <conservative.ca/
privacy-policy>; Green Party of Canada, “Important Information and Privacy Policy” (last 
visited 25 October 2020), online: Green Party of Canada <greenparty.ca/en/privacy>; BLOC 
Québécois, “Politique de protection des renseignements personnels” (last visited 25 October 
2020), online: BLOC Québécois <www2.blocquebecois.org/politique-de-protection-des-
renseignements-personnels>; New Democratic Party of Canada, “Privacy Policy” (last visited 
25 October 2020), online: New Democratic Party of Canada <ndp.ca/privacy>.
107. See Colin Bennett, “So You Just Want Politicians to Leave You Alone? Good Luck With 
That” (24 August 2015), online: iPolitics <ipolitics.ca/2015/08/24/so-you-just-want-
politicians-to-leave-you-alone-good-luck-with-that>; Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections,” supra 
note 105; Judge & Pal, “Privacy and the Electorate,” supra note 49.
108. CEA, supra note 8, s 385(2)(k), s 385(4), s 385.1
109. Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections,” supra note 105.
110. Howard & Kreiss, supra note 42 at 28.
111. See Bennett & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy Protection, supra 
note 32 at 22-24 (for an account of some notable voter privacy breaches in Canada).
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for the data that political parties hold about voters contributes to parties being 
targeted by hostile foreign entities for digital interference.112
Under self-regulation, the existing political parties’ privacy policies have 
varied with regard to consent.113 The parties’ practices, unclear privacy policies, 
and vulnerabilities with respect to parties’ data acquisition, data sales, and data 
security have significant implications for voter privacy and undermine voters’ 
ability to meaningfully decide whether to consent to their data being collected 
and used. It is difficult for individuals to understand what data parties hold about 
them and what they are doing with it. The policies are unclear about which 
activities are covered under the policies and particularly unhelpful about key 
aspects of big data practices, such as the type of data that is collected and the 
sources from which it is obtained. A party could have multiple privacy policies, 
produced for different purposes, not all of which are comprehensive or made 
publicly available online. Although each policy may be requested by the public, 
it is difficult for someone to know that policies other than those online even exist 
so as to be able to make such a request.114
There is also a lack of transparency around political parties’ use of databrokers, 
the degree to which campaigns rely on them, and whether the resulting profiles 
are accurate predictors of voter behaviour. In addition, it is difficult to determine 
with exactitude the types of inferences that are being made, the precise volume of 
data on each prospective voter, the precision of their micro-targeting techniques, 
the efficacy of such techniques, the types of messages delivered to voters, the use 
of such tactics outside the election period, and the extent to which some people 
are at risk of being excluded from political messages simply by virtue of their 
persuadability score.
Self-regulation of voter privacy by political parties has been wholly insufficient 
for voter privacy protection. Political parties are heavily regulated entities in nearly 
all other aspects. They are exempt from current privacy law because MPs, who are 
overwhelmingly affiliated with a political party, have not made political parties 
subject to the privacy rules that apply to the public and private sectors. With 
112. Communications Security Establishment, Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process 
(Communications Security Establishment, 2017) [CSE, Cyber Threats]; Communications 
Security Establishment, 2019 Update: Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process 
(Communications Security Establishment, 2019) [CSE, 2019 Update]. See also David Thaw, 
“From Russia with Love” (2019) University of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No 
2019-32, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=3038308>.
113. See Judge & Pal, SSHRC Knowledge Synthesis Grant, supra note 49; Bennett, “Data-Driven 
Elections,” supra note 105.
114. McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 35.
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the widespread use of big data analytics among federal political parties, the legal 
status quo is unsustainable. The potential for the misuse of personal information 
about individual voters is enormous. There is no enforcement mechanism for 
violations of a party’s privacy policy and, indeed, a voter is unlikely to even hear 
about any misuse as there is no reporting obligation either. The regulation of 
databrokers and intermediaries, as commercial entities subject to PIPEDA, may 
provide some protection for voter information, but it does not protect voters 
once the data is in the hands of parties, which can acquire, analyze, and share the 
data without regulatory restraint if they do so for a political purpose.
Parliament sought to address some of these deficiencies in 2018 with the 
voter privacy provisions of the EMA. Though an important first step, we argue 
in the next section that these amendments in the EMA were inadequate to 
protect voter privacy.
D. THE START OF MEANINGFUL REGULATION? THE ELECTIONS 
MODERNIZATION ACT
The 2018 EMA is the first time that Parliament has obliged parties to address the 
voter privacy issue and hence moves, to a modest degree, away from the largely 
self-regulatory model that previously prevailed. The EMA mandates that political 
parties adopt a “policy for the protection of personal information.”115 Existing 
parties must file privacy policies with Elections Canada, provide a public internet 
link to the policy, name an officer responsible for administering the policy, and 
ensure updates are transmitted to Elections Canada. According to the CEA, 
parties must specify the types of information they collect and how they do so, 
how they protect and use that information, whether the information is sold, 
how they train those who have access to the information, and their practices 
regarding the collection of information online and use of cookies.116 The penalties 
for breaching the obligations in the EMA are significant, with parties that fail 
to comply facing potential deregistration.117 Deregistration means that a party 
would no longer have the benefits of party status under the CEA and could not 
contest federal elections as a single entity. New parties will have their applications 
for registered party status rejected if they do not comply with the privacy policy 
requirements in the EMA.118
115. CEA, supra note 8, s 385(2), as amended by EMA, supra note 13, s 254(1).
116. CEA, supra note 8, ss 385(2)(k), 385(4), 385.1.
117. Ibid, s 385.1(2).
118. Ibid.
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While an important first step, the measures in the EMA are still inadequate 
to protect the personal information of voters. First, although the EMA requires 
that each registered party have a privacy policy, the requirement is nominal. The 
legislation simply outlines that the parties must have a privacy policy describing 
their approach to data collection, retention, and use, but it does not impose 
substantive privacy criteria for these policies. It does not require that they 
adhere to the fair information practices set out in PIPEDA or the Privacy Act, 
nor does it establish other privacy standards tailored to political parties. As the 
BC Information and Privacy Commissioner described of the limited import of 
section 385 of the CEA, “it imposes no substantive requirements relating to the 
collection, use or disclosure of personal information,” and is “in substance merely 
a transparency measure.”119 Hence the EMA codifies the existing, flawed practice 
under self-regulation whereby parties have privacy policies, but where the policies 
have little impact on the actual protection of voter privacy.120
Second, there is no enforcement mechanism to examine the accuracy and 
sufficiency of statements made by the parties. Deregistration is a blunt instrument 
that is rarely used by the CEO, and it is difficult to imagine a CEO deregistering 
one of the major parties for failing to update its privacy policy. New parties can 
easily meet the standard by simply having a policy that states what they choose to 
do. There is no authority for the CEO to sanction a party for breaching its own 
rules or for adopting rules that fall below some minimum standard since threshold 
standards are not specified by the amendments. In jointly prepared guidance in 
2019 for political parties to comply with the new EMA requirements, the Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) and CEO remarked that “the new law 
prescribes some elements of content [but] it does not require that content comply 
with international privacy standards.”121 Their guidance accordingly consisted 
of one page on the legally proscribed content and several pages on hortatory 
recommendations. Open Media, in a 2019 report, examined whether federal 
parties’ policies complied with the joint guidance on recommended practices and 
119. Order P19-02, supra note 92, at para 70.
120. See Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections,” supra note 105.
121. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Guidance for Federal Political Parties on 
Protecting Personal Information” (1 April 2019), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/
collecting-personal-information/gd_pp_201904> [OPC, “Guidance for Federal 
Political Parties”].
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found, at best, that the parties attained partial credit in some areas and, in most 
cases, they had failing grades.122
Third, the EMA is revealing with regard to some existing political party 
practices. Section 385(2)(k)(iii) of the CEA (as amended by the EMA) requires 
parties to set out in their official policies “under what circumstances that personal 
information [collected by the party] may be sold to any person or entity.”123 
The legislation thus acknowledges, but does not prohibit, the practice of parties 
commercializing voter data; this has further problematic implications as it 
suggests that the sale of voter data by political parties is also not covered as a 
“commercial activity” under PIPEDA.
The EMA is therefore no more than a first step. It expands the regulatory 
ambitions of the CEA to include voter privacy and the protection of personal 
information, which is an important move forward. Without further reforms, 
however, the EMA will be incomplete and potentially harmful if it provides 
the illusion of movement toward voter privacy and decreases the urgency 
around the issue.
III. REFORMING VOTER PRIVACY: BEYOND THE EMA
Canadian law needs to be updated to reflect the serious repercussions for voter 
privacy of digital campaigning and data-driven elections. The current legal 
framework under both elections law and privacy law is inadequate for voter 
privacy. The status quo of self-regulation by political parties, augmented by the 
requirement from the EMA that all parties have a privacy policy, does not provide 
adequate privacy protection through elections law. The amendments in the EMA 
were minor and, more formal than substantive, did not provide significant 
privacy protection to voters. Privacy law, meanwhile, has left political parties out 
of both the public and private sector legislation. In this Part, we detail how voters’ 
privacy should be protected and how political parties should be regulated.
There are several plausible legislative options for regulating political parties 
to protect voter privacy. The first option would be to include political parties 
under one of the existing federal privacy statutes. The second main legislative 
option would be to amend the CEA again to impose privacy obligations on 
122. Open Media, “Canada’s Political Parties Privacy Policies: An Assessment Against Best 
Practices Defined by Elections Canada and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner” (2019), 
online: <openmedia.org/article/item/how-do-they-score-we-rated-new-privacy-policies-all-
major-parties-and-every-single-one-failed-key>.
123. EMA, supra note 13, s 254(1).
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parties that are stricter than those added in 2018 by the relatively anemic privacy 
provisions in the EMA.124
A. EXISTING PRIVACY LEGISLATION: THE PRIVACY ACT AND PIPEDA
Placing political parties under the auspices of either of the existing privacy 
statutes would be counter-productive. The Privacy Act is not a realistic model 
given that political parties, although heavily regulated, are still private entities 
and very different from the government departments and Crown corporations 
subject to that law. If political parties were to be incorporated under the ambit 
of one of the existing federal privacy statutes, the critical consensus has leaned 
heavily toward PIPEDA as the better option.125
The problem with the PIPEDA approach, however, is that PIPEDA has 
been widely criticized for being out of date, inadequately addressing new 
technologies, lacking strong investigatory and enforcement mechanisms, and not 
implementing higher standards for privacy protection in the private sector.126 
There have frequently been calls from Parliament and the academic community 
to revise PIPEDA.127 The Trudeau government’s proposed “Digital Charter” 
of May 2019 signalled its intent to significantly amend PIPEDA.128 Due to a lack 
of details in the Digital Charter, it remains to be seen precisely how it would do 
so and the extent of the changes. It is also not clear whether those changes will 
be implemented, given that the Liberal government was reduced to a minority in 
the October 2019 federal election.
Merely incorporating political parties in PIPEDA’s existing framework 
without also making significant changes to PIPEDA would not provide adequate 
privacy for voters. As PIPEDA has not been updated for algorithmic processing, 
even if political parties were to be added to the jurisdiction of PIPEDA it 
would not prevent political parties from engaging in big data practices; rather, 
124. A third possibility would be stand-alone legislation with a privacy framework specifically 
designed for parties, but this approach seems unlikely, in our view, given the existence of 
federal electoral and privacy legislation. We do not consider this option in detail here. In any 
event, our recommendations on the content and jurisdiction would be the same.
125. See Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections,” supra note 105; Lithwick, supra note 105; ETHI, 
Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5.
126. See ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5 at 5-6, 20-32, 60-69; OPC, Trust but 
Verify, supra note 5.
127. See ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5 at 8-11 (on attempts at legislative 
amendment), 16-18 (on academic criticism regarding consent).
128. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Strengthening Privacy for the 
Digital Age: Proposals to Modernize the Personal Information Protection and Electronics 
Documents Act, (2019), online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00107.html> [ISEDC].
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it would oblige the parties to adhere to fair information principles, including 
notice and consent.129 But fair information principles, which already govern the 
private sector, have not protected Canadians against the mass data collection and 
analysis of their personal information. The problem is not that political parties 
have been left out of an effective privacy statute; if true, that could be remediated 
by amending PIPEDA to incorporate political parties. Rather, the problem is 
more far reaching as the existing privacy legislation has not worked well. Among 
other issues, PIPEDA suffers from a weak notion of consent that has failed to 
stem vast collection of data about individuals, weak enforcement mechanisms 
that has left the OPC with few serious compliance measures, and a legislative 
framework that has not been adequately updated to account for the seismic shifts 
wrought by big data.130
B. THE CANADA ELECTIONS ACT
The second option is to place the reforms in the main electoral legislation, the 
CEA. One of the main virtues of doing so is that Elections Canada is the agency 
with specialised and deep expertise in election administration. The CEA already 
regulates parties extensively and assigns responsibility for administering those 
provisions to the CEO. Parties are private entities, but with an important public 
role as an intermediary institution between voters and government. Elections 
Canada is in regular close contact with federal political parties as mandated 
by statute,131 including through the provision of guidelines and interpretation 
notes, which are answers to questions posed by the parties about the agency’s 
interpretation of various legal or administrative matters,132 and the Advisory 
Committee of Political Parties,133 where representatives of the parties provide 
129. See PIPEDA, supra note 7.
130. See ISEDC, supra note 128; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Real Fears, 
Real Solutions: A plan for restoring confidence in Canada’s privacy regime (Annual Report 
to Parliament on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
and  the Privacy Act) Catalogue No IP51-1E-PDF (2017), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/
opc-actions-and-decisions/ar_index/201617/ar_201617>; ETHI, Towards Privacy by 
Design, supra note 5; ETHI, Towards Democracy Under Threat, supra note 5; Standing 
Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, Driving Change: Technology and 
the Future of the Automated Vehicle (January 2018) (Chair: David Tkachuk), online (pdf ): 
<sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/TRCM/Reports/COM_RPT_TRCM_
AutomatedVehicles_e.pdf>.
131. See CEA, supra note 8, s 21.1.
132. Ibid, s 16.1-16.5.
133. Ibid, s 21.1(1)-(4).
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the CEO with “advice and recommendations.”134 Keeping electoral oversight 
under one roof is appealing as it would build on Elections Canada’s existing 
expertise. One of the criticisms of the amendments that addressed the “robocalls” 
from the 2011 election was that it hived responsibility off to the CRTC, which 
is not as steeped in electoral matters as Elections Canada.135 This approach 
potentially meant losing the benefit of Elections Canada’s expertise in regulation 
of “robocalls.” It also increased the burden on the regulated entities, namely the 
parties themselves, to interact with multiple regulators.
The CEA has steadily expanded its ambit over the last several decades to 
include regulation of entities and activities that were previously outside of 
its reach, including leadership campaigns and contestants, electoral district 
associations, social media platforms, and so on. The EMA took a first step to 
including privacy as well. Adding content to the framework established by the 
2018 amendments in relation to privacy would not be at odds with the approach 
or scope of the CEA as a whole.
The drawback to this approach is that Elections Canada does not have 
specific expertise with privacy. The entity with expertise on privacy at the federal 
level is the OPC. While the CEO has expertise in dealing with political parties 
and understands the nuances of the political process, the OPC has expertise 
in data protection and understands the nuances of privacy-invasive activities. 
The OPC has jurisdiction over both the Privacy Act and PIPEDA. Giving the 
OPC jurisdiction over political parties in relation to voter privacy would be 
consistent with their mission to “protect and promote privacy rights” and may 
be most efficient from the perspective of individual voters. In either case, clear 
statutory language would be needed in order to render the grant of authority to 
oversee voter privacy to the particular agency. As Officers of Parliament, each is 
constrained by their specific home statutes.
In a 2013 report, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada recommended 
that legislation be amended to grant Elections Canada jurisdiction over privacy 
breaches by political parties.136 The report states:
In order to preserve the confidence of Canadians in the political entities with whom 
they deal, and in order to better protect the privacy of Canadian electors dealing 
with political entities, it is recommended that the Canada Elections Act be amended 
134. Ibid, s 21.1(2).
135. Michael Pal, “Electoral Management Bodies as a Fourth Branch of Government” (2016) 21 
Rev Con Studies 85 at 93.
136. Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Preventing Deceptive Communication with Electors 
(Ottawa: Elections Canada, 2013) [CEO, “Preventing Deceptive Communications”].
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to provide a mechanism by which the application of privacy protection principles 
governing most Canadian institutions and organizations would be extended to 
political parties.137
Responding to the report, the OPC agreed with the recommendation to impose 
privacy standards on political parties, but did not explicitly endorse the idea that 
Elections Canada be given the mandate:
We welcome the report from Elections Canada, which highlights the fact that there 
is currently a gap in coverage under federal privacy legislation and suggests measures 
to address this gap. We feel this is an issue that warrants public discussion…We are 
pleased to see a recommendation that political parties should be required to meet 
these standards.138
Joint administration by both the federal privacy and election bodies is possible. 
Along the model of the Copyright Act, which is jointly administered by Canadian 
Heritage and Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (formerly 
Industry Canada), privacy obligations imposed on the political parties could be 
jointly administered by the CEO and the OPC.139 This approach would have the 
advantage of specifically balancing democratic processes with voter privacy and 
could regulate political parties beyond defined campaign periods to acknowledge 
parties’ continual interactions with the electorate.
If only one agency were to have jurisdiction over political parties’ data 
practices, Elections Canada is the preferable option. Elections Canada is a 
non-partisan and independent agency with a mandate to administer and monitor 
compliance with the CEA and to conduct federal elections. It is likely to be better 
able to balance the special context of protecting personal information about voters 
along with the democratic need for political parties to be in communication with, 
137. Ibid at 32.
138. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, News Release, “Statement 
from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Regarding a Report 
by Elections Canada” (27 March 2013), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/
news-and-announcements/2013/nr-c_130327>.
139. ISEDC administers the Copyright Act through the Canadian Intellectual Property Office 
and develops copyright policy jointly with the Copyright Policy Branch of Canadian 
Heritage. See Canadian Intellectual Property Office, ISEDC, online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/
cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/Home>; Copyright Policy Branch, Canadian Heritage, 
online: <www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/copyright-policy-branch.html>; 
Canada, Minister of Canadian Heritage and Minister of Industry, Status Report on Copyright 
Reform (24 March 2004), Submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Canadian Heritage (2005), online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/rp01133.html>.
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and responsive to, voters. If this option is chosen, there should be amendments to 
the CEA that specifically grant Elections Canada this authority.
C. CONCLUSION ON LEGISLATION
Given the deficiencies in existing privacy legislation, we favour more stringent 
privacy protections specifically tailored to political parties and recommend 
that they be implemented through the CEA and with jurisdiction granted to 
the CEO. By separating oversight of voter privacy from the main agency on 
privacy writ large, the OPC, this approach would also foster an appreciation for 
how protection of voter privacy must be crafted with a view to the particular 
relationship between voters and parties and the role of parties in a democracy. 
The rest of this section details relevant considerations for crafting the content of 
stronger privacy protection specific to voters and parties.
D. GUIDELINES FOR VOTER PRIVACY REFORM
Such a framework should situate voter privacy as a limit upon the activities of 
political actors, but without stifling the connection between parties and voters 
that is essential to democratic life. To the extent possible, both the choices voters 
make about their own data and the ability of parties to be able to communicate 
with the electorate should be respected. The legislative model of data protection 
and its fair information principles are, at best, minimal requirements. Protecting 
voter privacy with data-driven campaigning requires a stronger privacy regime.140 
In the following guidelines, we acknowledge, but go beyond, fair information 
principles to build a privacy framework that is tailored to the specific context 
of voters and elections and that is cognizant of the particular impacts of big 
data analytics.
1. MANDATORY OBLIGATIONs
First, any privacy rules that apply to political parties must be mandatory. The 
CEA does not rely on voluntary regulation by parties of their other activities that 
are consequential to the electoral process and should not rely on self-regulation 
with regard to the protection of voters’ personal information. The inadequacies 
of the current self-regulatory regime for parties have already been detailed in 
140. For arguments that fair information principles are inadequate to deal with the privacy risks 
posed by big data, see Rubinstein, supra note 2 at 1; Woodrow Hartzog, “The Inadequate, 
Invaluable Fair Information Principles” (2017) 76 Md L Rev 952 at 954; Anna Romanou, 
“The Necessity of the Implementation of Privacy by Design in Sectors Where Data 
Protection Concerns Arise” (2018) 34 Computer L & Security Rev 99 at 109.
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previous sections. There are compelling reasons why privacy standards in relation 
to parties should have different content than those in other contexts that 
apply to commercial or government entities. Parties have a unique role in the 
constitutional, electoral, and democratic order. Their particular role, however, 
does not displace the risk that self-regulation will lead to under-protection of 
privacy, because stringent privacy standards would be at odds with the short-term 
interests of parties. For example, mandatory disclosure of a data breach by a party 
would expose them to critique and could even harm their electoral prospects 
if the resulting harm was wide-spread and egregious enough. Rules on data 
collection, to take another example, might restrict the information that ultimately 
ends up with parties, and therefore hinder their attempts at micro-targeted 
voter communications. Ensuring that voter privacy is protected would also cost 
parties money and resources in additional labour and technical infrastructure, 
compounded by the lack of continuity in staffing and the rapid and large spikes 
in temporary personnel during campaigns.
Parties could adopt the view that voter privacy is important as a matter of 
principle or that their long-term interests are better served by the trust that could 
be generated if voters have faith that their personal information, if acquired, will 
not be unduly harvested or misused. There is a large literature in Canada, however, 
on how narrow interpretations of a party’s own partisan and electoral self-interest 
often shape the decisions of governments around electoral legislation.141 There is 
no reason to assume that voter privacy would somehow escape the partisan lenses 
that shape the laws regulating elections more generally.
It could be countered that parties should be left as unregulated as possible 
as a general matter so that the state does not interfere in their internal workings, 
and that this principle suggests that the government could nudge parties to 
protect voter privacy but should not impose hard regulations.142 However, 
this hands-off approach of self-regulation coupled with rhetorical support for 
141. See Heather MacIvor, “Do Canadian Political Parties Form a Cartel?” (1996) 29 Can J Pol 
Sci 317; Colin Feasby, “Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process” 
(2005) 29 SCLR (2d) 237; Michael Pal, “Breakdowns in the Democratic Process and the 
Law of Canadian Democracy” (2011) 57 McGill LJ 299 at 319-21; Yasmin Dawood, 
“Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights Approach to Judicial 
Review” (2012) 62 UTLJ 499.
142. See Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008) (drawing on behavioural economics for a 
“libertarian paternalism” approach in which government provides choice architecture to 
nudge people toward decisions preferred by the government without mandating conduct 
through hard law).
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privacy protections effectively exists now and has fallen short. Parties have not 
been vigilant in protecting voter privacy and have not voluntarily refrained from 
adopting practices and technologies that pose serious privacy risks to voters, 
including big data analytics and reliance on data brokers. The parties’ incentives 
in favour of data collection have been exacerbated by the low cost of data storage. 
Self-regulation has been tried and has been insufficient to protect voter privacy.
Elections Canada and the BC Information and Privacy Commissioner 
have suggested implementing a voluntary code of conduct for political parties, 
including protections for personal information.143 The advantages of a voluntary 
code are to provide more persuasive power to regulators, increase public trust 
in parties, encourage the parties to coalesce around common practices, remind 
parties of their duties to the public, support party members with ethical 
concerns, and to be consistent with other sectors that have implemented codes 
of ethics.144 Elections Canada’s 2020 discussion paper on voter privacy observed 
that a “voluntary code may be more palatable to political parties than legislated 
change, while at the same time moving towards increasing electors’ privacy.”145 
However, a voluntary code of conduct would be susceptible to the same problems 
that have afflicted the current self-regulatory approach where, in the absence of 
a statutory mandate, the incentives for parties have been in favour of collecting 
more information about voters to obtain an electoral advantage. A voluntary 
code might simply reiterate the statutory obligations that already exist, on the 
one hand, or be too vague or general to provide practical guidance, on the other 
hand.146 In the absence of statutory requirements to protect voter privacy, coupled 
143. Elections Canada, “A Code of Ethics or Code of Conduct for Political Parties as a 
Potential Tool to Strengthen Electoral Democracy in Canada” (2018), online: <www.
elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/tech/cod&document=table&lang=e> [EC, 
“Code of Ethics”].
144. McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 43-44.
145. Elections Canada, Political Communications in the Digital Age, Discussion Paper 3: The 
Protection of Electors’ Personal Information in the Federal Electoral Context (May 2020) at 17, 
online: <www.elections.ca/res/cons/dis/compol/dis3/dis3_e.pdf>.
146. See EC, “Code of Ethics,” supra note 143. Indeed, it is suggestive that PIPEDA, which has 
been criticized as a “creature of compromise” attributable to its original drafting style, is itself 
a result of codifying a model code that originated as a self-regulatory scheme for business. 
ISEDC, supra note 128, at Part 4.
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with enforcement powers to secure compliance, the parties are unlikely to effect 
strong change on their own.147
2. CONTINuOus APPLICATION OF PRIVACY OBLIGATIONs
Second, privacy protections should apply continuously, rather than being time 
limited or tied to an electoral event, to align with the full-year and years-long 
campaign strategies of political parties. Rules limited to specific election periods 
have been problematic in other contexts. For example, the rules limiting spending 
by political parties and third parties are restricted to the official campaign period, 
beginning with the drawing up of the writ and ending on election day. The EMA 
introduced a slightly longer period in which spending is regulated, by imposing 
a pre-writ spending limit that begins on June 30 of an election year in the lead 
up to the fixed date vote in October.148 These time-based restrictions create an 
obvious loophole, as political and third parties have incentives to advertise in 
the unregulated period where no spending limit applies.149 Another factor is 
the lack of continuity in political parties’ staff. During campaigns, parties see 
rapid influxes of temporary personnel who often have access to troves of voter 
information without adequate privacy training to protect it.150 To avoid creating 
any gaps in privacy protection, any privacy rules that apply to parties should 
apply at all times, and not simply during the official election campaign or the 
immediate pre-writ period. The counter argument against continuous restrictions 
on spending limits is primarily a constitutional one. As spending on advertising is 
covered by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ (“Charter”) guarantee of 
free political expression in section 2(b), restrictions over a longer time frame are 
147. If Canada were to implement a statutory code, oversight could be placed either with the 
Commissioner of Canada Elections, who is located in the Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, or with Elections Canada since the 2014 changes in the FEA. See FEA, supra 
note 30; EC, “Code of Ethics,” supra note 143. The UK ICO recommended a statutory code 
of conduct. See ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3, at 44. The ICO has since issued a 
draft framework for a code of conduct. See United Kingdom, Information Commissioner’s 
Office, Guidance on Political Campaigning: Draft Framework Code for Consultation (2019), 
online (pdf ): <ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2615563/guidance-on-political-
campaigning-draft-framework-code-for-consultation.pdf>.
148. EMA, supra note 13, s 349.1.
149. Pal, “Is the Permanent Campaign the End of the Egalitarian Model of Elections?,” supra note 8.
150. See McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 29 (recommending that political parties in 
BC provide employee and volunteer training plans and materials before they can receive 
the voter lists).
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more harmful to individual rights holders.151 But this has to be weighed against 
the right to privacy and democratic principles.
3. PROTECT INDIVIDUAL VOTERS RATHER THAN “VOTER DATA”
Third, legislation to protect voter privacy should focus on protecting the privacy 
of voters and not simply protecting the category of “voter data.” Data about 
individuals does not fit neatly into boxes. It may be characterised as “voter 
data” when political parties use it for political purposes such as determining the 
persuadability of voters; however, the same data deployed for a different purpose 
by a different actor may be characterised as “consumer data” or “advertising data.” 
With big data analytics, what political parties do is hard to differentiate from 
what commercial actors do and is often based on commercial approaches. Both 
are interested in commercial data, both draw inferences about preferences, and 
both develop psychographic profiles about individuals. Political parties do this 
to gauge the likelihood of voting and persuadability; commercial actors do so 
to gauge the likelihood of buying and product preferences. Given the ubiquity, 
fluidity, and variety of data, and the proclivity of political parties for extrapolating 
political preferences from non-political data, it would be difficult to administer 
a system that sharply differentiates between players in the data ecosystem, and 
it would be difficult to provide effective privacy protection for voters in such a 
segmented system. With the multitude of layers, actors, technologies, and data 
sources involved, an effective regulatory measure should not depend on legislative 
distinctions that are hard to administer. It should not differentiate between “voter 
data” and other categories of data, between data from “political” sources and 
non-political sources, or between data drawn from “political” activities and other 
activities.152 Recognizing a separate category of “voter data” or a separate category 
of “political” sources in the law would be at odds with how data ecosystems 
actually operate in practice and the multiple channels of information drawn 
upon by parties.
One could argue that if voter data cannot be disentangled from other data, 
why not simply include political parties under PIPEDA along with commercial 
entities? PIPEDA, as currently constituted, is inadequate for the regulation of 
personal information and commercial entities, as detailed above, in Part II.A., 
and would likewise provide insufficient protection if it were to regulate voter 
151. Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11, s 2(b).
152. See Roger A Ford, “Unilateral Invasion of Privacy” Notre Dame L Rev 1075 at 1083 (on the 
difficulty of differentiating types of data). See Delacourt, supra note 37.
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data and political parties. While voter data is hard to differentiate from 
other personal information, in our view it would be difficult or perhaps even 
impossible to adequately accommodate the context of political parties even in 
a reformed PIPEDA. The relationship between political parties and voters is 
of a different kind than that between commercial entities and consumers. The 
balance required to facilitate communication between parties and voters so as to 
respect the foundational importance of that relationship in a democracy, while 
respecting legitimate privacy concerns, is difficult enough to achieve on its own, 
as the failure to do so to date in Canadian legislation demonstrates. Striking 
that balance between facilitating democracy and upholding privacy would not 
be possible if other concerns related to commercial entities and relationships 
were added to the mix and if the legal mechanism to carry out that effort was 
hampered by PIPEDA’s flaws.
4. TECHNOLOGICAL NEuTRALITY AND FuTuRE-FOCusED REGuLATION
Fourth, Canada should adopt a technologically neutral approach in its regulation. 
Protection for voter privacy would be undermined by even the best possible 
legislative response if the reforms were explicitly tied to existing technologies 
for collecting and analysing personal information. Technology and, as a result, 
political campaigning, are rapidly evolving. Legislative protection for voter privacy 
will be more effective if it is neutral with regard to the technology being used. 
In other words, it should be broad enough to apply even to new technologies 
that will inevitably develop, and which will, equally inevitably, be deployed by 
campaigns and thus have an impact on voter privacy.
The importance of technological neutrality has been emphasised in related 
areas of the law. The Supreme Court of Canada has supported the principle of 
technological neutrality in various contexts whereby, unless there is Parliamentary 
intent to the contrary, the statute “should not be interpreted or applied to favour 
or discriminate against any particular form of technology,” and the statute’s 
traditional balance “must be maintained across all technological contexts” and 
“should be preserved in the digital environment.”153 Applying this principle, 
voter privacy legislation should not attempt to specify the types of technology 
153. Canadian Broadcasting Corp v SODRAC 2003 Inc, 2015 SCC 57 at paras 66-68.
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that are used to collect data, nor the methods that are used to analyse that data.154 
As media and devices can change with different technologies, the legislation 
should not be locked into a particular format, process, or source.
It is possible that, by being too general and abstract, privacy-focused reforms 
might undermine their long-term effectiveness, as the particular details of 
technologies or their uses matter. However, legislation crafted too specifically 
around a particular technology is vulnerable to being outdated quickly. Similarly, 
legislation designed around particular platforms or business models may be too 
restricted and may make it difficult for all affected companies to comply. For 
example, amendments introducing a requirement that social media platforms 
maintain registries of political advertisements communicated on their sites were 
heavily critiqued by some of the platforms for being designed around the technical 
specifics of Facebook. Google, for instance, claimed that it was impossible for them 
to comply with the new requirements, given how advertisements were placed on 
their sites.155 Care should thus be taken to ensure that the intended subjects of 
the regulatory regime are able to comply. The saga around the advertising registry 
is a cautionary tale. Without technological neutrality, reforms may not achieve 
the desired objective because they are too narrowly focused and, even if effective, 
may quickly be obsolete because of technological developments. It is important 
to note that even statutes designed to be technologically neutral, such as PIPEDA, 
still reflect the concerns and practices made possible by the technologies of their 
time,156 and thus the need for amendments for even a well-crafted statute will be 
foreseeable at some future horizon. However, that time period can be lengthened 
154. For example, although Europe’s modernization efforts to update privacy law to incorporate 
automated processes are laudable, there are already critiques that the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) is not forward thinking enough in its language around the technologies. 
See EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ 679/2016 [GDPR]. See Karen McCullagh, “The General Data 
Protection Regulation: A Partial Success for Children on Social Network Sites?” in Tobias 
Bräutigam & Samuli Miettinen, eds, Data Protection, Privacy and European Regulation in 
the Digital Age (Unigrafia, 2016) 110 at 122, 127-29; Michael Butterworth, “The ICO and 
Artificial Intelligence: The Role of Fairness in the GDPR Framework” (2018) 34 Computer 
L & Sec Rev 257 at 265; Jenna Lindqvist, “New Challenges to Personal Data Processing 
Agreements: is the GDPR Fit to Deal with Contract, Accountability and Liability in a World 
of the Internet of Things?” (2018) 26 Intl JL & IT 45 at 61-63.
155. See Tom Cardoso, “Google to Ban Political Ads Ahead of Federal Election, Citing New 
Transparency Rules” (4 March 2019), online: The Globe and Mail <www.theglobeandmail.
com/politics/article-google-to-ban-political-ads-ahead-of-federal-election-citing-new>.
156. See ISEDC, supra note 128 at Part A: Possible Options—Consent and Transparency.
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by a commitment to technological neutrality in the design of the statutory 
framework. Technological neutrality remains an essential aspect of any reform 
likely to be meaningful in the long term.
5. LIMIT DATA usE TO POLITICAL PuRPOsEs ONLY AND PROHIBIT 
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
Fifth, the uses to which political parties can put voter data must be strictly tied 
to their role in democracy. Parties should be permitted to use voter data only for 
“political purposes,” meaning non-commercial activities. Parties play a key role in 
democracy, but they are in a relatively privileged position. Even though the direct 
per vote subsidy, which gave parties quarterly funding based on their vote totals 
from the previous election, was eliminated, parties receive significant indirect 
public financial support. The contributions that sustain their activities are subject 
to generous tax rebates, far exceeding those in the charitable sector.157 Parties and 
their candidates also receive significant reimbursement of the expenses that they 
incur to contest elections.158 Registered parties have a variety of statutory and 
even constitutional protections.159 This preferential treatment can be justified on 
the basis that healthy parties are required for electoral democracy to function. 
But permitting parties to use data for non-political purposes would unduly 
permit them to use these financial benefits and rights outside of the realm of 
electoral politics. This would be contrary to the reason for those benefits and 
rights being conferred, which was strictly to have robust democratic competition 
for votes and seats.
It is true that the definition of a “political party” in section 2 of the CEA 
only requires that “one of [its] fundamental purposes is to participate in public 
affairs by endorsing one or more of its members as candidates and supporting 
their election.”160 One could interpret the definition not only to permit, but 
even to anticipate, that parties would engage in non-political purposes. The 
more persuasive reading of the definition, however, is that parties might engage 
in activities other than endorsing candidates, such as fundraising, expressing 
157. See Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 127(3).
158. See Elections Canada, “Total Paid Election Expenses and Reimbursements, by Registered 
Political Party – 2015 General Election” (12 May 2020), online:  <www.elections.ca/content.
aspx?section=fin&dir=oth/pol/remb&document=table1_15&lang=e> (for the most recent 
publicly available reimbursement data).
159. See e.g. Figueroa, supra note 11. There, the Supreme Court found that onerous 
rules depriving small political parties of the benefits conferred by registration were 
unconstitutional for violating section 3 of the Charter.
160. CEA, supra note 8.
JuDGE, PAL,  VOTER PRIVACY AND BIG-DATA ELECTIONs 41
political views, advertising, and so on. Although these activities might not always 
be directly related to electing candidates, these other purposes for its behaviour 
are assumed to be political rather than, say, religious or commercial or some other 
shared purpose that the members might pursue.
Any discussion of potential commercial activities by parties raises the issue of 
whether they should be allowed to sell valuable commodities that they hold, such 
as voter data. Political parties should not be permitted to sell voter data to other 
entities or transfer it to any entity seeking to use this information for commercial 
gain. This rule is appropriate for several reasons. If parties were permitted to 
sell voter data, individuals would likely be reluctant to provide information to 
parties, which would hamper democracy more generally. Few individuals would 
anticipate that indicating their voting preferences to a door-to-door canvasser, 
“liking” a photo of a leader’s newborn baby, or sharing a photo of a candidate 
would mean their information is transmitted for a price to a commercial entity 
seeking to sell rafting tours, children’s clothes, or movie tickets.
It is not clear what public policy rationale would exist for continuing to permit 
political parties to sell the data they have collected about voters to non-political 
entities. Perhaps it could be justified as a necessary evil to provide the funds 
parties need to operate. The generous, though indirect, public funds available to 
parties undermine the strength of any such claim. Selling data provides money 
to the parties but without improving parties’ ability to communicate with voters, 
and it further hampers voter privacy.
The EMA merely requires that parties disclose their policy with regard to 
selling data and does not restrict the practice. In doing so, it advances voter privacy 
incrementally, without addressing the fundamental issue that the sale of voter data 
by parties is harmful to democratic participation. Rather than permitting parties 
to sell voter data only if individuals consent, we instead recommend establishing 
a general rule that political parties are permitted to use personal information only 
for political purposes and are banned from any commercial activity with respect 
to voter data. Limiting the use of personal data to the purposes for which it was 
collected is an established fair information principle,161 and the only defensible 
use that political parties should make of data are those related to the parties’ 
political purpose.
161. See PIPEDA, supra note 7, Schedule 1, s 4.5, Principle 5 (stating “[u]nless the individual 
consents otherwise or it is required by law, personal information can only be used or 
disclosed for the purposes for which it was collected.”).
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL42
6. INFORMED CONSENT
Sixth, parties should be required to comply with the principle of informed 
consent for all uses of personal data for political purposes. Consent is intended 
to support autonomy by allowing individuals to choose what happens with 
their personal information. Although consent is a central mechanism for data 
protection legislation, it has not been effective in providing individuals with 
real control or decision-making over their data. The OPC’s 2019 Guidelines 
for Obtaining Meaningful Consent remarks that “advances in technology and 
the use of lengthy, legalistic privacy policies have too often served to make the 
control – and personal autonomy – that should be enabled by consent nothing 
more than illusory.”162
This “illusion” of control is particularly salient for voters, who lack enough 
information and enough alternatives to make consent meaningful in the context 
of big data analytics by political parties.163 The information asymmetry endemic 
to big data practices makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to know what 
information parties have about them and how it is being used by parties. It is also 
hard for voters to know what other entities have access to the data and where it 
goes in their hands and to exercise meaningful choice about those downstream 
uses. The lack of accountability in parties’ data practices will not improve much 
with the 2018 elections law amendments, which require basic disclosures of 
certain data activities but not voter consent. The EMA only requires parties to 
disclose “the party’s practices concerning…the collection and use of personal 
information created from online activity.”164 But it imposes no obligation that 
the parties obtain voters’ consent for these data practices.
162. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful 
Consent (24 May 2018), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/collecting-personal-
information/consent/gl_omc_201805> [OPC, Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful 
Consent]. See also, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Consent” 
(2019), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/collecting-personal-information/
consent>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Submissions Received for 
the Consultation on Consent” (2016), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/
what-we-do/consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-on-consent-under-pipeda/
submissions-received-for-the-consultation-on-consent>.
163. See Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Interim 
Report, supra note 5, at para 75 (noting that social media companies “give users the illusion of 
users having freedom over how they control their data, but they make it extremely difficult, 
in practice, for users to protect their data”). For the final report, see UK, Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Final Report, Eighth Report of 
Session 2017-19 (Cm 1791, 2019).
164. EMA, supra note 13, s 254(1)(v)(A).
JuDGE, PAL,  VOTER PRIVACY AND BIG-DATA ELECTIONs 43
The practices for obtaining consent by the private sector are continuing to 
develop, as showcased in the ETHI Committee’s report on updating PIPEDA 
and in the OPC’s Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful Consent.165 Those 
reports continue to support individual consent as a viable regulatory mechanism 
and suggest ways to strengthen it. The OPC principles emphasize that consent is 
“an ongoing process that changes as circumstances change” and should be treated 
as “a dynamic and interactive process.”166 The intrusiveness of big data practices 
should require more stringent consent.
We recommend that informed consent obligations apply to political parties. 
Political parties should be required to obtain voters’ explicit consent and respond 
to the privacy preferences that individuals hold. The applicable regulatory agency 
should develop an informed consent policy, to which parties are required to 
adhere, for in-person and online interactions with voters and also with respect to 
the parties’ acquisition and analysis of voter data. Informed consent would require 
that political parties provide individuals with information in a user-friendly form 
about what data is being collected, how it is being collected, and whom it is 
being shared with, and that individuals explicitly agree to the specific use of 
their data.167 The policy should set out explicit threshold requirements for parties 
setting out how and when parties must obtain consent, the data activities that 
require consent, and the parties’ confidentiality obligations with respect to the 
data. The responsible agency should periodically review the template informed 
consent policy to update it for technology changes that affect voter privacy. 
Political parties should generally be required to obtain informed consent for any 
personal information, including inferences pertaining to individuals, such as 
persuadability scores. Inferences about individuals should be treated as personal 
information regardless of whether the inferences are accurate or predictive.168 
165. ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5 at 25-28; OPC, Guidelines for Obtaining 
Meaningful Consent, supra note 162.
166. OPC, Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful Consent, supra note 162.
167. PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 6.1 (which provides one version). See also Ontario Personal 
Health Information Protection Act, 2004, SO 2004, c 3, Schedule A, s 18(5) (defining 
“knowledgeable consent” as “if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the 
individual knows, (a) the purposes of the collection, use or disclosure, as the case may be; 
and (b) that the individual may give or withhold consent”).
168. See Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (UK), Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: 
Final Report, supra note 163 at para 48 (supporting ICO’s recommendation that “inferred 
data should be as protected under the law as personal information” and recommending 
that the UK Government study how “the protections of privacy law can be expanded to 
include models that are used to make inferences about individuals, in particular during 
political campaigning”).
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Incorrect inferences may still have an impact on the individual about whom the 
inference was made and should therefore be included as personal information. 
For example, a party may wrongly infer that voters with certain movie or vacation 
preferences are unpersuadable for their party, causing a party’s candidates not to 
contact those voters.
Political parties should also be responsible for ensuring that consent was 
obtained throughout the “data chain” and that all relevant parties obtained 
explicit consent for any data to be used for a political purpose.169 Parties should 
be ultimately responsible for ensuring that informed consent has been obtained 
for all data, and should not rely on statements about consent made by third 
parties such as databrokers and social media platforms.170 Political parties should 
be responsible for the campaign-related activities of their associated databrokers 
and for any downstream uses of voter information. Similarly, individuals may 
consent only to the use of their own information, and not information about 
other people. Political parties must seek consent from the voter and not piggyback 
off the consent of an individual who allows access to their contacts.
Voters should not have the burden of trying to trace where all the data 
has come from and whether they consented at each step. In the context of 
algorithmic processes, it is difficult for voters to know what data is being used 
for what purpose and what assumptions underlie the inferences being made.171 
As political inferences are made from an amalgamation of data that may have 
little to do explicitly with politics, voters will have difficulty detecting that their 
data is being used for this purpose. Relatedly, the volume and complexity of these 
data transactions makes it difficult for government regulators to monitor consent 
and impose effective accountability measures on campaigns. Hence, the burden 
should be on political parties to demonstrate informed consent by individual 
voters for all data. Parties should be required to keep records documenting 
169. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office similarly recommends that political parties 
apply “due diligence when sourcing personal information from third party organizations, 
including data brokers, to ensure the appropriate consent has been sought from the 
individuals concerned.” ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 5.
170. See similarly ibid, at 51 (noting that “[w]e do not believe that insertion of simple contractual 
terms between [a political party] and a data broker is sufficient to mitigate the risk”).
171. Rob Kitchin describes three challenges to researching algorithms: obstacles to gaining access 
to their formulation; algorithms are heterogeneous and embedded in wider systems; and 
their work unfolds contextually and contingently. Rob Kitchin, “Thinking Critically About 
and Researching Algorithms,” (2017) 20 Info Comm & Soc’y 14. These obstacles would 
also hinder transparency and accountability with respect to campaign algorithms. They are 
suggestive of the difficulties that would likely be encountered by regulators trying to monitor 
algorithms and individuals trying to protect their data.
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consent for all data, and these records should be subject to audits in the same way 
that records of party finances are.
7. EXPAND OPT-OuT TO COVER ANY PERsONAL INFORMATION HELD BY 
POLITICAL PARTIES
Seventh, voters should have the ability to opt out of any collection and use by 
political parties of their personal information. In other contexts, as detailed in 
Part II, many contacts between political parties and voters are regulated.172 Under 
these existing rules, voters have some ability to control their contact with political 
parties. Voters already have the right to opt out from the Register and to request 
to be on a party’s internal do-not-call list. Other aspects of unsolicited contacts 
by political parties are also regulated. The CRTC regulates unsolicited calls 
during federal elections and has identified “[p]rotecting citizens’ right to privacy” 
as an objective for these rules.173
Extrapolating from these rules, voters should be able to have greater control 
over whether and how their data is collected and used by political parties. 
To update the existing voter contact rules and provide similar privacy control in 
the big data context, voters should be able to opt out of their information being 
included in political parties’ databases. We recommend that political parties be 
prohibited from collecting or using personal information about any voter who 
has opted out of the Registry unless they provide explicit consent for these 
other data uses.
We also recommend that the CEO should undertake educational efforts 
to notify voters of their opt-out options. Currently, there is a check-off box on 
individual income tax forms that people can select to opt out of the Canada 
Revenue Agency sharing their information with Elections Canada to update the 
Register. The CEO could additionally coordinate the process by which voters 
may opt out from political parties’ databases. To increase transparency and 
accountability around political parties’ data practices, the CEO should educate 
voters about how political parties use their personal information, the voters’ 
rights with respect to their data, and their options to opt out of political party 
databases. Material informing voters of their ability to opt out from the electoral 
Register, as well as from political party databases, could be included on mailed 
voter cards and on prominent notices at polling stations.
172. CRTC, “Rules for Unsolicited Telecommunications Made on Behalf of Political 
Entities,” supra note 97.
173. CRTC, “Protecting You from Rogue and Misleading Calls During Federal Elections,” 
supra note 104.
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One concern might be that, if individuals are able to pre-emptively and 
generally opt-out of contact from political parties, there would be a reduction in 
the number of Canadians that parties could contact to solicit their views, votes, 
and financial contributions. But in practice, few voters have opted out of the 
Register.174 Political parties and candidates may continue to use the list of electors 
to communicate with voters who have not exercised their opt out, including for 
the purposes of soliciting contributions and recruiting party members. Political 
parties could continue to use non-identifiable personal information to formulate 
public policy and to use personally identifiable information of voters who consent.
8. ADDITIONAL VOTER RIGHTs PERTAINING TO BIG DATA ANALYTICs
Eighth, beyond fair information principles, voters should have additional rights 
to address big data. Neither federal nor provincial privacy legislation adequately 
considers the impact of big data and predictive analytics. PIPEDA has not been 
amended yet to incorporate the new challenges of big data analytics, nor have 
the other major privacy statutes in Canada. The European Union’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force in 2018, updates 
the EU Privacy Directive by addressing automated processing of data.175 The 
GDPR confronts the challenges of big data by, inter alia, increasing transparency 
obligations,176 regulating algorithmic decision making by enforcing a right to an 
explanation,177 emphasizing consent,178 and placing increased responsibilities on 
data controllers through the right to erasure179 and the right to de-index.180 Under 
the GDPR, political opinion is part of the regulation’s definition of “sensitive 
174. In a June 2019 report, Elections Canada reports that there are 26.1 million electors on the 
Register, and since 1997, there have been 4200 opt outs from the Register and 160 requests 
to opt out from sharing data with other jurisdictions. Elections Canada, National Register of 
Electors—Updates: June 2019 Annual Lists, Report (Elections Canada, June 2019).
175. EC, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31. See also Barbara McIsaac, Rick Shields & Kris 
Klein, The Law of Privacy in Canada, Student ed (Carswell, 2004); Colin J Bennett, “Voter 
Databases, Micro-targeting, and Data Protection Law: Can Political Parties Campaign in 
Europe as they do in North America?” (2016) 6 Intl Data Privacy L 261 at 267.
176. GDPR, supra note 154, art 12.
177. Ibid, art 22. See also Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, “European Union Regulations on 
Algorithmic Decision-Making and a ‘Right to Explanation’” (Fall 2017) AI Magazine 50.
178. GDPR, supra note 154, art 7.
179. Ibid, art 17.
180. Ibid, art 18.
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form of personal data.”181 Recital 56 of the GDPR permits political parties to 
compile data on political opinion, but parties’ data practices remain subject to 
the GDPR.182 The European Commission has provided guidance for various 
election-related actors on GDPR’s data protection rules, which advise parties 
and data analytics companies not to process personal data that was provided for 
a purpose unrelated to the election and advise social media companies not to 
share data with other companies without explicit consent.183 In the Parliamentary 
report by Canada’s Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and 
Ethics,184 the committee recommended that Canadian privacy legislation place 
greater emphasis on big data problems185 and made several recommendations 
that borrow from the GDPR.186
We recommend incorporating rights to increase transparency and 
accountability about parties’ use of big data and analytics. Individuals should 
have a right to know specifics about what information political parties hold about 
them and where it was obtained. Voters should also have a right to correct the 
data if it is inaccurate. More controversial among the GDPR rights would be to 
grant voters a right of explanation, which would provide voters with a right to 
know the reasons for algorithmic decisions made about their voting preferences 
181. Ibid, art 9(1).
182. Ibid, art 9(2), Recital 56 (stating that, in the course of electoral activities, where the operation 
of the democratic system requires in certain Member States that political parties compile data 
on people’s political opinion, the processing of such data may be permitted for reasons of 
important public interest, provided that appropriate safeguards are established). Parties must 
still comply with GDPR provisions pertaining to data protection, access requests, consent, 
data retention, data minimization, and deletion. See ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 
3 at 19 (with reference to the GDPR, “political parties are not exempt from data protection 
law; they have responsibilities as data controllers to comply with all the requirements of the 
law, including the data protection principles”); UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, 
Guidance on Political Campaigning, vol 3.1 (ICO: 28 March 2018) (updated guidance for 
parties on application of GDPR to political campaigns).
183. European Commission, “Protecting Europeans’ Personal Data in Elections” (12 
September 2018), online (pdf ): <ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/
soteu2018-factsheet-personal-data-elections_en.pdf>.
184. ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5.
185. Ibid at 23.
186. For example, Recommendation 3: algorithmic transparency, Recommendation 11: right to 
erasure, Recommendation 12: right to de-indexing, Recommendation 13: destruction of 
personal information. Ibid at 25, 43-50.
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and persuadability, and a right to erase data.187 By comparison, PIPEDA’s fair 
information principles include having accurate and complete data, and having 
access to data in order to challenge its accuracy and completeness and have 
it amended.188 However, there is neither a right to erase data nor a right to 
explanation in PIPEDA.
On the one hand, a right to erase information could frustrate the function 
of political parties in interacting with voters before and during election time. 
On the other hand, voter autonomy and informed consent would support 
voters being able have their data removed if they no longer want to be included, 
or never consented to being included, in a party’s database. A right to erase would 
be consistent with other options Canadian voters have, including opt-outs for 
the national Register and requesting to be placed on a party’s internal do-not-call 
list. A right to erase could be seen as effectuating and updating these existing 
voter rights by providing similar mechanisms for voters to exercise their data 
preferences in the context of big data.
We endorse a compromise position that parties would be obliged to destroy 
some data at the request of the voter, such as that obtained through big data 
inferences, while being permitted to keep the basic data to which they are entitled 
from the Register (provided the voter did not opt out) or to retain some other 
minimally intrusive subset of data. Parties should also be permitted to retain 
data that was volunteered by voters through direct interactions with parties or 
candidates, such as during canvassing. Claims from parties that they are entitled 
to keep basic information needed to communicate with the electorate and 
information that they have obtained through direct voter interactions are more 
compelling than claims that political parties are entitled to keep data that has been 
acquired from a commercial entity, data that includes non-political information, 
or psychological inferences drawn from such data, when the individual wants 
it to be destroyed. We also support a limited data retention period of ten years, 
as described below in Part III.D.10.
Finally, at this time we do not recommend that voters have a right to know 
what political decisions political parties have made about them on the basis of 
big data. We believe that a right to explanation would impinge on campaign 
187. See GDPR, supra note 154, art 15, art 17, and Recital 71. The GDPR’s most explicit 
description of the right of explanation is in Recital 71, which is non-binding. Recital 71 
provides that decisions based solely on automated processing and producing a legal effect 
that significantly affect a data subject should have suitable safeguards, including specific 
information to the data subject and the right to human intervention to obtain an explanation 
of the decision and to challenge it.
188. PIPEDA, supra note 7, Schedule 1, ss 4.6, 4.9, Principles 6 and 9.
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strategies and party policies. We therefore do not recommend a GDPR-style right 
to an explanation, but it is an option that is likely to be considered.
9. DATA SHARING
Ninth, in addition to political parties being barred from using data for 
non-political purposes, which would preclude parties from selling information 
to commercial actors, political parties should be regulated in how they share voter 
information. We recommend three rules for data sharing with third parties, data 
sharing with other parties, and data sharing within a party.
I. DATA SHARING—THIRD PARTIES
Political parties should be prevented from sharing voter information with third 
parties. Third parties are broadly defined in section 349 of the CEA to include 
any entities or individuals other than political parties, candidates, leadership 
contestants, nomination contestants, and electoral district associations. Political 
advertising by third parties is heavily regulated by the CEA. Third parties are 
required to register spending over $500 on political advertising, to disclose 
information on their structure and activities to Elections Canada, and to abide by 
a spending limit for advertising during the election period.189 Political parties and 
third parties are distinct legal entities and must operate at arm’s length.190 Political 
parties are legally barred from colluding in a variety of ways with third parties.191 
The collusion rules in the Elections Act, which are designed to prevent attempts 
to evade the rules on political advertising, impose mandatory registration of 
third parties, require disclosure about the entity purchasing the advertising, and 
establish financial spending limits for both political parties and third parties.192
The same type of collusion rules that apply to political advertising should 
apply to data. Collusion between political parties and third parties on voter 
data is as troubling as collusion between political parties and third parties on 
advertising. Any type of collusion between the entities harms electoral integrity. 
189. CEA, supra note 8, s 353(1).
190. See CEA, supra note 8, s. 349, where the definition of “third party” excludes registered 
political parties and their candidates and electoral district associations.
191. See Michael Pal, “Third Party Political Participation and Anti-Collusion Rules” (2018) 61 
Can Pub Admin 284.
192. See Elections Canada, “Interacting with Third Parties in the Pre-election and Election 
Periods” in Political Financing Handbook for Registered Parties and Chief Agents 
(April 2020), ch 11.
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Collusion between political parties and third parties around voter data has the 
added dimension of potentially harming voter privacy.
Such rules prohibiting data collusion would limit the flow of information 
between political parties and third parties. There would be minimal—if any—
harms resulting from such reforms. Any significant exchange of information 
that leads to coordination around advertising, for example, is already barred, 
since they are distinct legal entities that must operate at arm’s length. The same 
reasoning applies to collusion about data that emerges from, for example, 
sharing information about voters. Permitting data collusion would undermine 
the effectiveness of the existing anti-collusion provisions in the CEA, which are 
focused on preventing avoidance of spending and contribution limits.
II. DATA SHARING—OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES
Data sharing between political parties in Canada is less problematic than sharing 
with third parties and should be permitted, provided there is informed consent by 
the voter. Data sharing between different Canadian political parties would arise if 
federal political parties want to formally divulge their voter information with their 
official provincial affiliates or the candidates for leadership of the party. Federal 
political parties might also wish to share the data informally with technically 
unaffiliated (but, in practice, politically allied) provincial parties, or even 
municipal candidates. In contrast to data transfers involving political parties and 
commercial entities, the data transfers between Canadian political parties involve 
entities that all have political purposes. In contrast to data sharing between 
political parties and third parties, the data sharing between Canadian political 
parties involves entities that operate in different election jurisdictions, which 
eliminates the concern about collusion that attaches to sharing with third parties.
Given these differences, a key issue that remains is voter consent for these 
downstream uses of voter data. To satisfy informed consent, the privacy rules 
applying to the data held by these other political parties should be clearly 
described. Voters should be able to get information when requested about data 
sharing and the privacy protections in place to protect their data in the hands 
of the transferee. It is possible that local or provincial rules are so diverse that 
there will be unsatisfactory privacy protection for the shared data when it reaches 
new hands. One option is that a party could share data with a second party 
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in another jurisdiction only where that jurisdiction has “substantially similar” 
privacy protections to those that would be operating at the federal level.193
III. DATA sHARING—WITHIN THE sAME PARTY
Information sharing within parties should largely be facilitated, provided that 
voter data is treated confidentially and appropriate security measures are taken, 
as discussed in Part III.D.10. As long as it is necessary for political activities, 
sharing information between the central party and its candidate in a riding or 
the electoral district association (EDA) should be permitted if reasonably related 
to the purposes for which a voter originally consented. Preventing the flow of 
information between affiliated entities would fly in the face of how parties operate, 
which is increasingly as centralised organizations.194 Such information may be 
particularly useful for campaigning or fundraising. Although under the CEA 
political parties are separate legal entities from candidates, leadership contestants, 
and EDAs, the CEA nonetheless envisions a close relationship between them and 
already facilitates it in multiple ways, such as permitting the transfer of money or 
non-monetary resources. Data should be treated the same way as other resources 
that the CEA already allows to be transferred, provided that there is a legitimate 
political purpose for the internal sharing of data. Parties should be required 
to have internal controls to make sure that only those authorised to view the 
data may do so.
10. CYBERsECuRITY PROTOCOLs
Tenth, political parties should be required to implement cybersecurity protocols 
to protect the storage and transmission of voter data by political parties. The 
193. A similar condition is in place with PIPEDA, where the federal legislation applies unless 
there is “substantially similar” provincial legislation. See PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 26(2)(b). 
This section provides that the Governor in Council can exempt organizations or activities 
from PIPEDA’s application if the province has passed substantially similar legislation. British 
Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta have their own provincial private-sector privacy legislation. 
See Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5; Personal Information Protection Act, 
SBC 2003, c 63; Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, 
CQLR c P-39.1. Additionally, Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland 
have their own health privacy legislation. See Personal Health Information Protection Act, 
2004, SO 2004, c 3, sched A; Personal Health Information Privacy and Access Act, SNB 2009, 
c P-7.05; Protection of Personal Health Information, SNL 2008, c P-7.01; Personal Health 
Information Act, SNS 2010, c 41.
194. See William Cross & Lisa Young, “Candidate Recruitment in Canada” in Amanda Bittner & 
Royce Koop, eds, Parties, Elections, and the Future of Canadian Politics (UBC Press, 2013) 24 
at 25-26. For example, there is central party involvement even in local candidate selection.
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unauthorised release of voter data would have privacy and national security 
implications. The unauthorised release of voters’ personal information can lead to 
identity theft, foreign surveillance, and foreign interference in elections. Political 
parties are data-rich targets for foreign actors, as evidenced by the hacking of 
the Democratic National Committee in the 2016 US presidential election.195 
The Communications Security Establishment of Canada (CSE)196 and Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)197 have both identified Canadian political 
parties as likely targets for foreign interference. The CEO in 2013 recommended 
amendments to the CEA “to require that political parties demonstrate due 
diligence when giving access to their voter databases.”198 The CEO highlighted the 
“privacy risks associated with these databases,” where political parties “not only 
handle large amounts of personal information, but also share this information 
with a small army of volunteers and local campaign workers.”199 The parties’ 
internal management practices matter for how much trust individuals will feel 
toward parties with regard to their data and are important for electoral integrity.
Parties should be required to adhere to established security protocols for 
data retention, encryption, and data breach notification. For data retention, 
we recommend that the maximum amount of time that voter data may be retained 
should be limited to ten years. A ten-year rule would cover at least two federal 
elections given the requirement, in section 4(1) of the Charter, that elections must 
be held at least every five years.200 By comparison, PIPEDA’s fair information 
principles limit the data retention period to only as long as necessary to fulfill 
195. The special counsel investigation by Robert Mueller indicted 13 Russian nationals and 3 
Russian entities accused of interfering with US elections and political processes. United 
States v Internet Research Agency, et al, (16 February 2018) DC Cir, Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF 
(Grand Jury Indictment).
196. CSE, Cyber Threats, supra note 112; CSE, 2019 Update, supra note 112. See generally 
Elizabeth F Judge & Michael Pal, “Election Cyber Security Challenges for Canada” (2019), 
online: Centre for International Governance Innovation <www.cigionline.org/articles/
election-cyber-security-challenges-canada>.
197. See Alex Boutilier, “‘Total’ Information Warfare a Threat to Democracy: CSIS Report” (22 
February 2018), online: The Toronto Star <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/02/22/
csis-says-total-information-warfare-a-threat-to-democracy.html>.
198. CEO, “Preventing Deceptive Communications,” supra note 137 at 32.
199. Ibid at 20.
200. Charter, supra note 151, s 4(1).
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the collection purpose.201 Applying PIPEDA’s purpose guideline could lead to 
extensive and indefinite retention periods of voter data since “political” purpose 
could be broadly construed. Shorter retention periods can lessen the impact of a 
data breach by decreasing the volume of stored data and can reduce the chance of 
inaccurate outdated data being stored. With the low price of data storage, parties 
have little economic incentive to delete data on their own initiative.202 For voters 
to have predictability about data retention, a fixed term of ten years is preferable. 
Parties should be required to implement internal security measures to protect 
voter data (including inferences) such as strong encryption, limiting the number 
of people who can access the parties’ databases, and prohibitions on accessing or 
storing voter data through unsecured mobile devices or networks. Political parties 
should be required to notify the CEO of any data breach involving voter data. 
Political parties should also limit the use of smart devices, such as home assistant 
devices and other “always-on” devices such as smart speakers, which could record 
discussions about voter information, resulting in unsecured access. Cloud storage 
and servers outside of Canada also pose security risks.
11. ENFORCEMENT
Finally, the authority for regulatory oversight of political parties’ practices 
regarding voter privacy should be specifically delineated in the resulting legislation 
and the available mechanisms for enforcement. PIPEDA has been plagued by 
weak enforcement measures. Under PIPEDA, the OPC lacks important powers 
such as the ability to levy fines and make orders, and individuals can file an action 
in court only after they file a complaint with the OPC and wait for the Privacy 
Commissioner’s findings to be issued. Under the EMA, there are provisions 
relevant to voter privacy, but their enforcement similarly lacks teeth. The EMA 
requires some reporting in parties’ privacy policies about voter data, but it is 
hard to assess what measures suffice since there are no substantive standards. 
Further, the enforcement remedy is deregistering, which is a blunt instrument 
that is unlikely to be applied to a political party.
201. PIPEDA, supra note 7, Schedule 1, s 4.5, Principle 5. See also Élections Québec, Partis 
politiques et protection des renseignements personnels: Exposé de la situation québécoise, 
perspectives comparées et recommandations, (Report) (Élections Québec, 2019) at 
90 (recommending that parties destroy personal information when the use is no 
longer necessary).
202. See McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 31. The BC Information and Privacy 
Commissioner, in his study of BC political parties, found “all the political parties had an 
undefined or indefinite retention period for personal information, including information that 
was incorrect or out of date.”
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To avoid repeating those enforcement errors, voter privacy legislation should 
include strong oversight, compliance, and enforcement measures (including 
audits, inspections, fines, and order making), and it should give individuals a 
right to bring a cause of action against a political party or campaign directly for 
privacy infringements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The move toward “big data” politics has serious implications not only for the 
privacy of Canadian voters but also for the health of democracy and the integrity 
of elections. As the BC Information and Privacy Commissioner observed,
robust communication with the electorate is…in the public interest, in the interest 
of democracy, and not just the political self-interest of the parties. However…this 
communication should be a fully transparent two-way street. A one sided dialogue 
in which the public is kept largely in the dark about the significant amounts of 
personal information collected and used about them is not sustainable legally or 
ethically.203
Nevertheless, the one-way street persists. The current state of legislation in Canada 
largely exempts political parties from regulation on the collection and use of 
voters’ information, apart from minor obligations in the 2018 amendments to 
the CEA that political parties have a privacy policy. Although there is no certainty 
that campaigns are running successful or accurate big data practices, concerns 
over the use—and potential misuse—of voters’ personal information arise 
regardless of the accuracy of the inferences made, given the granularity of voter 
data in political campaigns, the mass collection of such data, and the manner 
in which such data is now being used. These big-data practices exacerbate the 
longstanding problem that political parties have not been regulated by privacy 
legislation and neither election laws nor other legislation has imposed privacy 
obligations on parties. So far, Canadian law has not adequately addressed the 
admittedly complicated interplay of privacy and democratic concerns around 
voter information in the elections context.204
203. McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 43.
204. After this article was published, the federal government introduced large-scale amendments 
to PIPEDA in Bill C-11. See Bill C-11, An Act to enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act 
and the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and to make consequential 
and related amendments to other Acts, 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl (first reading 17 November 2020), 
online: <parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-11/first-reading>. However, Bill C-11 
does not address the absence of meaningful privacy regulation for political parties as political 
parties are not subject to the proposed changes to the privacy framework.
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Political practices have evolved rapidly over the course of several elections 
with reliance on big data and microtargeting, and the lack of strong privacy 
regulation has become more glaring. Data-driven campaigning is here, and 
here to stay, if we are to judge by the predominance of data-dependent 
campaigns, the perceived success of data-driven candidates, and the laments by 
less-than-successful candidates that their fortunes would have been different had 
there been more and better data about voters. Campaigns, if not voters, seem to 
be true believers in the value of data. The issues with voter privacy that we have 
identified in this article are likely to only grow in significance in Canadian politics 
as new techniques of data analysis relying on more invasive and larger quantities 
of personal information and new technologies for the more precise analysis of 
that data emerge, underscoring the need to find solutions to address the gaps in 
the regulatory framework. It makes little sense that political parties be permitted 
to operate outside of generally accepted principles of privacy law and best 
practices for protecting personal information. Political information about voters’ 
beliefs and preferences should be accorded the same protection as the personal 
information that is held by the private and public sectors about Canadians. Legal 
reform to protect voter privacy should be done in a manner that respects the 
personal information of voters and the democratic connection between parties 
and voters. Toward this end, we have provided eleven guidelines for the design of 
legislation to protect voter privacy in the age of big-data elections.

